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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the role of regional organizations in peacemaking and
peacekeeping, particularly on the effects of peace agreement duration. This is important
because the United Nations has been traditionally seen as the default international
peacekeeping force but recently, more responsibility is being given to regional
organizations.
This study hypothesizes that regional organizations’ ability to clear commitment
problems, create specific agreements, and willingness to enforce agreements make them
the most effective third parties to deal with many conflicts. However, the study also
hypothesizes that regional organizations are less fit to mediate conflicts based around
ethnicity, identity, or religious disparities.
By utilizing a mixture of logistic regression and case studies, the results illustrate
that regional organizations are an essential asset to creating agreements that elongate the
duration of peace. In testing for the partiality of regional organizations, the specifics of
agreements made, the willingness and capabilities of enforcement, the reason for the
conflict and the institutionalization of the organization, quantitative and qualitative results
illustrate that regional organizations are a valid tool for conflict management.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION
After the end of the Cold War, the literature investigating the mechanisms behind
conflict and conflict resolution began to grow. While a great body of work has studied
conflict prevention and conflict management, less attention has been directed to what
makes peace agreements last, whether or not third-party management can ease the peace
agreement process and if so, which organizations are most successful. The official
international peacekeeping force has traditionally been the United Nations but slowly,
more responsibility is being given to regional organizations. Under the United Nations
Charter - Chapter VIII, regional organizations can be tasked with a variety of peacekeeping
tasks but the definition of regional organizations is purposefully vague, allowing for
flexibility. What is fairly clear is that the relationship is meant to be top-down:1 Article 53
of Chapter VIII states that while the United Nations Security Council may make use of
regional organizations “where appropriate”, these organizations cannot take enforcement
action without prior approval of the Security Council.2
After some time, scholars began measuring the effectiveness of the UN, of these regional
arrangements and the relationship between these two. Many works hypothesized that
regional organizations should be utilized more often because they are closer to the conflict
zones and can portray more legitimacy to the belligerents. They can also alleviate some of
the burden from the United Nations since it cannot handle all the world’s conflicts. Part of
1Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping (New
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1992) para. 64.
2 United Nations, “Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements,” Charter of the United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml
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this is due to bureaucratic difficulties, such as veto power of various members, 3 but also
because of financial burdens. Of course, there are those who believe that it is simply the
goal of the UN to buck-pass its responsibilities to regional organizations.4 There are few
works that specifically address the length of peace agreements and what may or may not
make them more successful. Even less attention has addressed which organizations may
be more effective. The majority of studies of this nature also have focused on intrastate
wars. Finally, there are those who are ardently opposed to the use of regional
organizations, claiming that the trouble outweighs their benefits, if they have any.
This study attempts to breakdown the studies of peace agreements in order to look
at them in terms of specific variables and understand not only what aspects of the
agreements themselves make them more effective, but what third party, if any, contributes
to their success. Regional organizations are theorized to be the most effective third party
for a variety of reasons, including their ability to clear commitment problems and their
geographical and political proximity to the conflicts under their “jurisdiction.” Today there
are roughly 38 international organizations with a mandate regarding peace and regional
security.5 These practically span the whole globe and can have significant presence and say
within their respective spheres of influence. Of course, these organizations may be better at
some types of conflict over others; for example, ethnic versus non-ethnic conflicts.

Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez, “Regional Organizations and Security Governance,” in The Security
Governance of Regional Organizations, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez (New York:
Routledge, 2011), 1.
4 Angel Angelov, “Regional Involvement in Peace Operations: An Analysis of the Debate within the Security
Council, “ Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 5 (2012), 618-619
5 Rodrigo Tavares, Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations (New York: Routledge,
2010), 5.
3
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The UCDP dataset also defines “agreement” and “Primary Warring Parties,” a
necessary inclusion.
An agreement is a binding mutual deal signed or publically agreed to.
Primary Warring Parties are two governments of a state in an interstate armed
conflict; or a government and any opposition organization or alliance of
organizations that uses armed force to promote its position in the incompatibility in
an intrastate armed conflict.6
The remainder of this research shall be structured fairly simply. Chapter Two will
not only cover a short history of regional organizations but examine arguments for and
against their usage, improvement strategies, and also what previous studies have been
attempted to measure their effectiveness. In Chapter Three, the design of the study will be
clarified, followed by the hypotheses and why they are important to test. Next, the
variables will be defined. Finally, the logistic regressions will be conducted and the results
will be disclosed, accompanied by interpretations and implications of the findings – both to
general research in academia and to policy making in terms of what assistance should be
given to regional organizations. Chapter Four will delve into the case studies with ECOMOG
in Sierra Leon and Guinea Bissau and with OSCE in Moldova. ECOMOG and OSCE are
examined due to their different histories, approaches to conflict management, and
experience in mediation. Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau are studied because while Sierra
Leone initially failed, ECOMOG was able to craft a later peace agreement which held.
Conversely, it was unable to craft a similar successful agreement in Guinea Bissau. Liberia
was not included because of its popularity in case studies regarding Africa. Chapter 5 will
Stina Högbladh, ”Peace agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset,” in States in
Armed Conflict 2011, eds. Pettersson Therése & Lotta Themnér ( Uppsala University: Department of Peace and
Conflict Research Report 99, 2012)
6

3

conclude with an overall summary of the study and its results, a critical look at the
implications of the results to academia and research, and suggestions for alternate methods
of conducting this study as well as suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW

Background
A myriad of authors have researched the mechanisms of war and conflict settlement
more generally. Arguments arise from all schools of thought, including rationalism, which
emphasizes belligerents’ use of cost-benefit analysis. Fearon and others address why states
may be unable to reach a settlement despite their preference to avoid costly conflict. The
first issue is informational problems. Leaders are unable to gather private information
about their adversaries and, for obvious reasons, are less than willing to offer it.
Informational problems are exacerbated because most bargainers have high incentives to
misrepresent their capabilities, resolve, and intentions.7
While this is a significant hurdle facing opposing parties attempting to reach a
peaceful settlement, commitment problems also play a large role. Commitment problems
state that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, both parties may have the
opportunity to renege on an agreement, if they even commit to one in the first place.8
Indeed, Werner’s study finds that agreements break down most often when one party has
incentive to renegotiate the terms of settlement9, perhaps due to a rapid shift in power10 or

Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006):170, doi: 10.
1017/S0020818306060061.
8 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 170.
9 Suzanne Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and
Renegotiating the Terms,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no.3 (1999): 918,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991840>
10 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 195.
7
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government.11 Finally, Fearon suggests that conflict cannot end in peaceful settlement if the
issue is indivisible; that is, there is no optimum settlement.12 Fearon and Powell state that
these situations are rare and despite the fact that the issue, such as a territory, may be
indivisible, there are still compromises or bargaining spaces that both parties would prefer
over conflict.13
According to Keohane, regimes should be rather successful in handling these issues
because they can reduce transaction costs and effective international regimes can ease
communications among officials.14 Since regimes are a “set of expectations, rules and
regulations, plans, organizations energies and financial commitments, which have been
accepted by a group of states,”15 it is appropriate to include regional organizations in this
definition. Furthermore, prescriptions are offered on how to enhance the effectiveness of
regional bodies. Several studies address these issues and find that conflict will end if there
is a stable government as well as institutional arrangements – due to civil wars being highly
correlated with national poverty16 – and the presence of a third party that can signal
resolve and guarantee safety of adversaries.17 Although specifically addressing civil wars,
third parties may be also be able to address the same issues in interstate conflicts;
however, even more debate surrounds which third party should handle disputes at all.
Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace,” 918.
James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no, 3 (1995): 382,
Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed November 5, 2012).
13 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 382; Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 177.
14 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984): 101.
15 Keohane, After Hegemony, 57
16 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science
Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 88, doi:10.1017/S0003055403000534.
17 Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 3
(1997): 362, doi:10.1162/002081897550384
11
12
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The basis of the argument regarding the nature of the relationship between the
United Nations and regional organizations could be similarly framed within the bounds of
universalism and regionalism. This division has been debated for over half a century but
took new strides near the end of World War II. Though more prominent an argument now,
advocates of universalism have hailed the rise of technology and communication as a
reason for a universal international organization. The criticisms leveled at regionalism are
more of a definitional – or perhaps operational – issue of what qualifies as a region. Is it
merely geography or is it also cultural and other considerations?18
This debate took further shape post-Cold War when many new states were formed
and there seemed to be an immediate rise in conflicts. The United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) began dispatching peacekeepers once more. During this time, although regional
organizations existed, the United Nations was still the leader in peacekeeping.19 In 1992,
the UN’s Secretary General Boutros-Ghali released An Agenda for Peace, a detailed report to
the General Assembly and the Security Council that gave regional organizations a role to
play, under Chapter VIII. After the failed missions in Somalia, the nature of United Nations
peacekeeping was fundamentally altered. The United States withdrew some of its support
and began supporting the idea of creating peacekeepers from within the region of
conflict.20 Though monetary support was not necessarily withdrawn, peacekeepers were
rarely dispatched under the United Nations banner. This, in turn, lowered the United
Pitman B Potter, “Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Organization” The American Political
Science Review 37, no. 5 (1943): 852
19 David Quayat, “The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New Paradigm for Peace?” Ottawa:
Conference of Defense Associations Institute (1999):4, http://www.cdacdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/quayat99.pdf
20 Quayat, “The United Nations and Regional Organizations,”5
18
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Nations’ capacity to respond to the many conflicts around the globe and offered regional
organizations a unique chance to become more involved.
Due to the definitional vagueness of Chapter VIII however, there has not been an
explicit outline detailing the relationship that the UN and regional organizations should
have. The lack of a solid definition has encouraged various research projects regarding the
effectiveness of the UN versus regional organizations. The arguments for strengthening
regional organizations seem to stem from the assumption that proximity to a conflict zone
is better for several reasons. From a “boots on the ground” perspective, regional
organizations can potentially respond much faster to a new conflict than the United
Nations not only because they are literally closer but also because they can come to a
conclusion regarding their involvement in a shorter span of time. Furthermore, member
states of these organizations share a history and, more than likely, a similar culture. This
allows for these organizations to better formulate their approach to these sensitive
situations and would also portray a higher degree of legitimacy because the organizations
are seen as “insiders.”21 Finally, regional organizations, because they are in such close
proximity, will be more concerned with finding a solution to end the conflict. 22 In more
recent history, some scholars are still more adamant than others in strengthening regional

Ole Elgström, Jacob Bercovitch, and Carl Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation: the
Effectiveness of Insider Mediators,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 3, no. 1 (2003):12,
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_2003_1.pdf
22 Richard Jones and Tamara Duffey, “Sharing the Burden of Peacekeeping: The UN & Regional Organizations,”
Peacekeeping & International Relations 25, no. 3 (1996): 6 (ATT: 02970618); see also Maurice Marnika,
“Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts,” Peacekeeping & International Relations 25, no.
3 (1996): 9 (ATT: 02970620).
21
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organizations, though some claim that much more work needs to be done in order to truly
see the effect of the UN and regional organizations.
Beginning in 2001, the United Nations began serious talks regarding cooperation
with regional organizations. These talks led to high-level meetings, culminating in
Resolution 1631 in 2005. The resolution laid out steps for furthering cooperation between
the UN and regional organizations. In 2006, the United Nations released a report detailing
the challenges and opportunities given by partnering with regional organizations. Kofi
Annan, then the Secretary General, reported that while regional organizations were well
capable of conflict prevention along with the United Nations, there is a lack of coordination
between the UN and these organizations when it pertains to peacemaking, peacekeeping,
and peacebuilding. The coordination issue was listed alongside the issue of capacity; clearly
some organizations will have better training and finances than others. Annan encourages
the United Nations to provide further backing to regional organizations. Though some
scholars concur with Annan’s push for more complex cooperation, their reasons are not
necessarily similar.
Some suggested the creation of Regional Security Commissions (RSC’s) that would
serve as middle-men between the United Nations and regional organizations, being legally
and politically accountable to both.23 The creation of such an entity is based on the
experience of the United Nations’ incapability to quickly react to crises and its need to
share its burden – an argument shared by those who advocate cooperation. However, while

Jon Lunn, “The Need for Regional Security Commissions within the UN System,” Security Dialogue 24, no. 4
(1993): 371, doi: 10.1177/0967010693024004003.
23
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the basis of the argument is the same, other authors call for the strengthening of regional
organizations instead of a creation of another bureaucratic arm of the United Nations; by
strengthening these organizations, they claim, the UN would also become stronger. 24 These
arguments are generally framed around the African Union (previously known as the
Organization of African Unity) – an organization that still pushes to gain more voice within
the UN to the modern day. In 2011, South Africa pushed for an initiative that would
effectively make regional organizations equal to the UN. Bolstered by the Libyan
intervention, South Africa questions the motives of a Security Council that not only
excludes members from Africa but all members of the developing world.25 Some authors
also posit that so long as regional organizations do not undermine the norms of the UN,
they actually serve to reinforce them, thus making themselves an asset.26
Conversely, there are scholars who range from reserved to firmly against the use of
regional organizations on several grounds. While accepting of the possible advantages of
the inclusion of regional organizations, some authors question the impartiality and capacity
– financial and otherwise – of regional organizations27 as well as their ability to handle the
higher tiers (military) of peacekeeping.28 Other authors include alternate factors of
determination, such as the whether the relationship between the UN and regional

Christopher J. Bakwesagha, “The Need to Strengthen Regional Organizations: A Rejoinder,” Security
Dialogue 24 (1993): 379, doi: 10.1177/0967010693024004004.
25 Stewart M. Patrick, “The UN versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace?” Council on Foreign
Relations, March 23, 2012, accessed July 17, 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/03/23/the-un-versusregional-organizations-who-keeps-the-peace/
26 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace
Operations,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 194, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137500>.
27 Marnika, “Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts,” 10
28 Davidson Black, “Widening the Spectrum: Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping Operations,”
Peacekeeping & International Relations 25, no. 3 (1996):7, (ATT: 02370619).
24
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organizations is one of “partnership” (horizontal) or one of “subcontracting” (vertical)29
and some find no reason to suggest regional organizations are more effective.30 Though not
a quantitative piece, Oliver examines the role of the UN in several conflicts including,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Oliver also examined the
role of CARICOM, a Caribbean organization, in Haiti and the role of NATO in Kosovo. Results
suggested that the effectiveness of the United Nations or regional organizations is directly
dependent on the level of consent of the parties that are involved. Specifically, the higher
level of the consent, the more responsibility should go to the United Nations.31
Quayat states that previous studies that touted the effectiveness of regional
organizations were primarily based on the European experience, namely NATO – an
example that is commonly used despite NATO not explicitly qualifying as a regional
organization.

32

Furthermore, some authors strongly believe that “the UN possesses the

moral authority of a world body that regional organizations lack.” 33 Dorn touches on
impartiality and capacity as well but adds that regional organizations are generally run by a
hegemon (a “bully” in his terms), using Nigeria and ECOWAS as an example.34 Dorn,
however, fails to take perception into account. Especially in the developing world, the UN is

29Hikaru

Yamashita, “Peacekeeping cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations,”
Review of International Studies 38 (2012): 168. doi: 10.1017/S0260210510001221.
30 Carolyn M. Shaw, “Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative o the United Nations Operations?” Journal of
Conflict Studies 15, no. 2 (1995). www.journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4546
31George F. Oliver, “The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?” International
Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 8 (2002):117,
<http://www.internationalpeacekeeping.org/pdf/04.pdf>
32 Quayat, “The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New Paradigm for Peace?” 2. See also Walter
Dorn, “Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way,” Peacekeeping & International Relations 27, no. 3/4 (1998): 3
33 Dorn, “Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way,” 3
34 Dorn “Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way,”3. See also Michael Barnett, “Partners in peace? The UN,
regional organizations, and peace-keeping,” Review of International Studies 21(1995): 429.
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sometimes seen as a bullying entity, especially with none of the developing world being
included in the Security Council.35 In addition, Dorn assumes neutrality is the most effective
stance while other studies have shown that partiality may allow for more agreements.36 In
general, these authors contend the disadvantages of regional organizations outweigh the
advantages, if there are any. Finally, there are those who disagree with the formation of
international institutions –“a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which state should
cooperate and compete with each other”37- more generally, claiming they do not fulfill their
promises of peacemaking because they hold little to no influence on state behavior.38
However, this argument has been countered by alternate results that show although
intergovernmental organizations are not foolproof, they do promote peace when
controlling for certain variables.39
Most scholars also tend to focus on the process of achieving an agreement and how
to potentially increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement. The cohesiveness and
institutionalizations of regional organizations are generally listed as the most important
factors.40 Other authors include whether or not the mandate of a regional organization

Patrick, “The UN versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace?”
See Andrew Kydd, “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” American Journal of Political
Science 47, no. 4 (2003): 607; Isak Svenson, “Who Brings Peace?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3
(2009): 463, doi: 10.1177/0022002709332207; Patrick M. Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the
Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 72, doi:
10.1177/0022002702046001004; Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 362
37 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3
(1994/95): 6, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0021.pdf
38 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 7.
39 Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote
Peace?” World Politics 57, no. 1 (2004): 7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/250542852>
40 Laurie Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations,” Crisis States Working Paper No.
2, 81 (2010): 2, ISSN: 1749-1800; see also Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental
Organizations Promote Peace?” 7.
35
36
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includes peacekeeping or conflict prevention.41 For example, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports the general consensus of non-interventionism, thus it
would generally not involve itself in conflicts among its members even though it is
institutionalized and highly cohesive. Wulf and Debeil and Ackermann tend to encourage
the building of better conflict prevention mechanisms such as early warning systems,42
more highly trained mediators,43 or more effective strategies of intervention.44
One aspect that pervades much of the literature of peacekeeping and peace
agreements is selection bias. Most cases chosen include third-party involvement, leaving
only a small number of studies in which no external involvement occurred.

45

However,

those authors that do include the latter cases face the problem of counterfactuals; although
it is a viable method to explore international relations phenomena, the methodology is
complex.46 This is particularly important given the occurrences of third-party involvements
occasionally worsening conflict.47 Alternatively, many studies fail to consider that there is
inherent bias in the study on third party involvement because third parties to not get
involved in conflicts at random. For example, there is evidence that peacekeeping missions
Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations,” 3.
Herbert Wulf and Tobias Debeil, “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms,” Crisis States Working
Papers Series No. 2, 49 (2009): 24, ISSN: 1749-1800; Alice Ackerman, “The Idea and Practice of Conflict
Prevention,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (2003): 343.
43 William J. Dixon, “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful
Settlement,” International Organization 50, no. 4 (2009): 664, doi: 10.1017/S0020818300033543.
44 Patrick M. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996): 34.
45 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of
Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2004): 269,
http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF
46 James Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43, no.2 (1991):
170. www.jstor.org/stable/2010470
47 Dixon, “Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,”
667.
41
42
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are more likely if the “United Nations or a regional IGO has previously been involved”,
suggesting more enduring conflict. Though the specific study was primarily concerned with
civil conflicts, its findings may be applicable to interstate wars as well.48
Of those that address the durability of peace, some found that the content of ceasefire agreements has a significant effect on how long peace lasts, as well as the cost and
outcome of the war. According to Fortna, if the agreements include high costs for an attack,
specify compliance in order to prevent accidents from backsliding into war, and provide
credible signals, the peace should hold.49 This correlates with Werner’s findings that the
most common reason for a breakdown of peace is the incentive for one party to attempt to
renegotiate the terms of settlement.50
A peace agreement that raises costs for war and provides credible signals should
discourage attempts of renegotiation. Walter contends that should agreements allow for all
parties to have an effective voice in the government, less military enforcers would be
necessary.51 Although she is referring to civil wars specifically, her argument implies that
specific provisions and longer lasting peace are positively correlated. Other research
addresses the issue of “ripeness” of conflict – the time frame in which both parties are

Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,”
Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 290, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022; see also
Mark J. Mullenbach, “Deciding to Keep the Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the
Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005): 551,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693606>
49 Virginia J. Fortna, “Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” International Organization 57,
no. 2 (2003): 342, doi: 10.1017/S0020818303572046.
50 Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace” 918.
51 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 362
48
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amenable to the idea of settlement.52 Establishing when this moment may occur, or if it is
occurring, requires not only intimate knowledge of conflict in general, but of the specific
conflict and parties involved – a task that may be best suited for organizations more
entrenched in the region. Finally, Fortna finds that once the non-randomness of third-party
involvement – specifically the United Nations - is accounted for, the presence of
peacekeepers significantly raises durability of peace for both interstate and intrastate
wars.53 Although these scholars delve into the issue of when peace agreements last or fail,
there is no systematic research on which organizations achieve success more often.
Finally, some authors address the role of state capacity in the success or failure of
peace agreements. State capacity, as defined by DeRouen, Jr. et al., is “the state’s ability to
accomplish those goals it pursues, possibly in the face of resistance by actors within the
state.”54 While several authors, including Fearon & Laitin and Taydas & Peksen apply state
capacity towards a state’s probability of experiencing the onset of a civil war55, Deroun et
al., and McBride et al., apply similar arguments to achieving a peace agreement and its
durability.56 Primarily centered around civil wars, several studies find that state capacity is
a strong determinant of the duration of peace agreements in civil wars because strong

Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, (Washington D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 14.
53 Virginia Page Fortna, “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate
Wars,” International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (2003): 111.
54 Karl DeRouen, Jr. et al., “Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity,” Journal of Peace
Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 335. doi: 10.1177/0022343310362169
55 See Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” and Zeynep Taydas and Dursun Peksen, “State
capacity, Quality of Governance and Civil War Onset,” paper presented at the 48 th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association, Chicago, (http://allacademic.com/meta/p180729_index.html).
56 See Karl DeRouen, Jr. et al., “Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity.” and McBride
et al., “Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 3 (2011): 446468.
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states are better able to implement agreement provisions57 and because they ensure the
commitment power of the states, particularly when a solution calls for a power-sharing
agreement.58 The investigation of state capacity is outside the scope of this thesis but
should be addressed in further research and applied to interstate conflicts to see if the
same holds true.

Hypotheses
It was stated previously that regional organizations should be the most successful at
peace agreements because of their ability to clear commitment problems and their greater
proximity to conflict or potential conflict areas. They are however, more effective at some
conflicts over others. These ideas rest on certain assumptions if they are to be true. First,
states are rational actors. Next, war is a means to an end, not the end itself. Finally, third
parties are assumed to want to end the conflicts, not begin or exacerbate them. Several
testable hypotheses can be extracted from these statements, each with their own value to
the end result. Some hypotheses will be tested quantitatively in Chapter Three while some
will be examined only qualitatively in Chapter Four; this is either due to too small an n to
run regressions or a lack of quantitative measure.
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H1: Peace agreements negotiated with the assistance of regional
organizations should last longer than those without third party
involvement or with the assistance of other kinds of third parties.
Though much of past researched assumed that neutral outside mediators were best
equipped to handle conflicts, new studies have shown that insider mediators tend to
produce better results.59

Specifically, Wehr and Lederach find that an ‘insider-partial’

mediator produces more trust because they are from within the conflict area and must deal
directly with the results.60 The ‘bias’ involved is not referring to the desire to see one actor
to prevail over another (outcome partiality); instead, it is related to the relationships that
the mediator has to all disputants, referred to as relational partiality.61
Placing this argument on a larger scale, regional organizations can represent
‘insider-partial’ parties because of their relationship with their member states.62 The
results of the conflict directly affect the organization, more so when considering that
conflicts left open ended can potentially spread throughout the region, making the conflict
costly to states that are not necessarily primary actors. Therefore, it is in the best interest
of the organization to return to the previous status quo: peace. 63 Although there are
instances of protracted conflicts between states or parties within the states, regional
organizations as a whole benefit more from peace.

Kydd, “Which Side Are You On?” 607.
Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach, “Mediating Conflict in Central America,” Journal of Peace Research 28,
no. 1, Special Issue on International Mediation (1991): 87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424196>
61 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation,” 15.
62 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation,” 17.
63 Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation and Conflict Resolution,” in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob
Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 346.
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H2: Peace agreements negotiated with the assistance of regional
organizations will be more specific than those negotiated without
assistance or with the assistance of other kinds of third parties.
The literature on bargaining tends to circle around three issues: informational
problems, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility.64 Informational problems occur
when parties in a conflict have incentives to misrepresent themselves in order to gain more
leverage in a bargaining situation.65 Third-parties can have the ability to diffuse these
informational problems in general. Because regional organizations understand the
background, culture, and other factors that may come into play in a negotiation66, they are
better suited to produce a clear but complex agreement that deal with the root causes of
the initial conflict and creates binding mechanisms to diffuse them. According to Hansen et
al., conflict management that includes binding agreements lead more often to peace
agreements.67
Finally, some authors find that culture may be the strongest factor in reaching the
goal of a solid, long-lasting peace agreement. Faure addresses the role of culture, stating
that because culture can affect so many aspects involved in negotiations, including
behaviors and beliefs, it can influence the outcome of negotiations, especially when stakes
are highest.68

Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 381-382.
Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 170.
66 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, “Regional Organizations and International Mediation,” 14.
67Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Stephen C. Nemeth, “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts:
Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 2 (2008): 311,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27638607>
68 Guy Olivier Faure, “Culture and Conflict Resolution,” in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob
Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 514.
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H3: Regional organizations are more willing to enforce peace
agreements than other kinds of third parties.
For the same reason that regional organizations are better able to create specific
agreements, they are also more willing to enforce the terms of the agreements. Their
proximity creates a less burdensome task out of providing peacekeepers to a conflict zone
if necessary. Also, utilizing regional capabilities stems the internationalization of the
conflict. Considering many third world attitudes towards major international peacekeeping
forces, many would prefer to keep conflicts as local as possible.69 Regional organizations
also are aware of what kind of sanctions will create the most effective response from the
involved conflict parties. Lastly, members of regional organizations, especially those who
have strong economic ties to neighboring nations, are more willing to take the risk of
enforcement because they are more likely to have economic stakes in the conflict.
H4: Peace agreements negotiated by regional organizations are
more likely to resolve tractable issues than intractable ones.
H1 stated that the inherent bias that regional organizations portray is favorable
because it encourages trust from the conflict parties that in turn, lead parties to perceive
their actions and mediation attempts as legitimate. Unfortunately, the same bias backfires
when faced with conflicts centered on intractable issues – religion, ethnicity, and
sometimes territory.

69
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Even though several quantitative works show that ethnicity and identity are
not significant variables to predict the onset of conflicts70, some authors claim that these
grievances can be produced by civil wars71 and Collier and Hoeffler show that ethnic
dominance can be a predictive factor of civil war onset.72 Both ethnicity and religion can
simplify the image of the ‘other’, which can lead to dehumanization and justify violence. 73
Finally, even an issue that literally is divisible – territory - can become intractable when
infused with symbolic qualities, such as identity or religious “chosenness”.74
These types of conflicts can make the bargaining procedure appear as a zerosum game, which contributes to the “polarization of positions and to continued
escalation…”75 of the situation. The insider partiality of regional organization can backfire
because the member states are within the conflict zone, the organization as a whole will be
subject to a much greater amount of pressure. The trust that is usually associated with
regional organizations may either be substituted with suspicion, particularly if many of the
members are from the ‘other’ category or one party of the conflict that may see itself as

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no 4 (2004):
588, doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064, Mearsheimer and Pope 1993, Kaufmann 1996
71 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” 88’ see also Chaim Kauffmann, “Possible and
Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 137.
72 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war,” 588.
73 S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution,”
in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman,
(London: Sage Publications, 2009), 281.
74 John A. Vasquez and Brandon Valeriano, “Territory as a Source of Conflict and a Road to Peace,” in The Sage
Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London:
Sage Publications, 2009), 194.
75 Diana Chiagas, “Negotiating Intractable Conflicts,” in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable
Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005):
151.
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closely allied with the organization may have its’ trust broken.76 Finally, even if an
agreement is reached, civil wars based upon ethnic lines are predisposed to reoccur.77
H5: Regional organizations that are highly institutionalized will
be more successful in creating durable agreements than less
institutionalized regional organizations.
A portion of the criticism leveled against regional organizations is that they are not
independent enough from their member states to police them effectively. The claim is that
the stronger states will be able to veto or ignore decisions from regional organizations.
Later studies attempted to establish what factors establish independence. Barnett and
Finnemore insist that international organizations can become independent of their
member states through “(1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and
(2) control over technical expertise and information.”78
Haftel and Thompson indicate that life span is the most significant factor in
independence of international organizations79 while Barnett states that collective identity,
shared interests, the presence of a hegemon, and agreement of purpose indicates whether
or not regional organizations specifically will be willing to act.80 Finally, Hansen et al., adds
to Haftel and Thompson, stating that having sufficient resources are an equally important

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, “Conclusion: From Intractable to Tractable-the
Outlook and Implications for Third Parties,” in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, eds.
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005): 380.
77 Joakim Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset,”
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (210): 248. doi: 10.1177/0022343309353108
78 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): 707.
79 Haftel and Thompson, “The Independence of International Organizations,” 269.
80 Barnett, “Partners in peace?” 420-422.
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factor.81 Although in theory this hypothesis could be tested quantitatively by measuring the
number of years since an organization’s inception, the n is far too small to produce useable
results. Therefore, this hypothesis shall be examined through case studies in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER THREE – STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Datasets
A mixture of databases was used in order to include variables that were not
available in one dataset. The dependent variable, the region, the incompatibility, ceasefire,
outstanding issues, outline and peacekeeping operations were taken from the UCDP Peace
Agreements Dataset v.2.82 In order to measure the dependent variable and incompatibility
from the UCDP dataset, certain categories were transformed or added. All other variables
were gathered from the PRIO battle deaths dataset.
Of the 215 total cases, 125 ended in the dyads’ return to conflict while in 90 cases,
conflict did not begin again for at least five years, if at all; this creates a fairly even and
sufficient sample size to apply several variables to. Of those cases, 68 had no third party
assistance, 57 had either a state or non-regional ad-hoc groups assist, 21 had assistance
from regional organizations or regional ad-hoc groups and 35 had “other” assistance.
“Other” assistance includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or an even group of
the other variables. For example, if the United Nations and regional organizations were
joint collaborations through mediation and agreement creation, they would be under this
category. As seen in Table 1, regional organizations have had more successes than failures.
Also, although the UCDP dataset included information on which 3rd party, if any, was
involved in ending the conflict, it was only in text; therefore, a variable coding the
information (party3_type) was added. Finally, the UCDP dataset included measures for
Stina Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, (Upsalla:
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2012),
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55064_UCDP_Peace_Agreement_Dataset_Codebook.pdf
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whether a conflict was over territory, government or both. An additional measure for
whether a conflict was regarding ethnic, religious, or ideological issues was included,
partially based on a previous study.83 The total number of cases for the final set was 215;
when including battle deaths data, cases dropped to 189 due to some missing information.
Table 1 - 3rd party and Conflict Cross-tabulation
Conflict in 5 years? * 3rd Party Type Cross-tabulation
3rd Party Type
None

State/s

Regional

Total
UN

Other

Org/Ad-hoc
Conflict in

Conflict

5 years?

Count
% within 3rd

42

32

10

22

19

125

61.8%

56.1%

47.6%

64.7

54.3

58.1%

%

%

Party Type
Absence of

Count

conflict

% within 3rd

26

25

11

12

16

90

38.2%

43.9%

52.4%

35.3

45.7

41.9%

%

%

Party Type
Total

Count
% within 3rd

68

57

21

34

35

215

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0

100.0

100.0

%

%

%

Party Type

Because the UCDP dataset did not include conflict deaths, PRIO’s Battle Deaths
dataset v.3 was included.84 To combine the two sets of information, each conflict that ended
in a peace agreement was found within the PRIO dataset. The “best” number of deaths
between the start of the conflict and the date of the peace agreement was calculated and
put into the master dataset. In order to make the regression simpler, the variable was made
into a dummy.
Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of Theoretical Literature,”
World Politics 52, no. 4 (2000): 447-449.
84 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle
Deaths”, European Journal of Population 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 145–166.
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Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable measures whether, after a peace agreement was reached,
there was any further conflict for a period of at least 60 months. A 60 month cut-off was
utilized primarily because it the cutoff point in the dataset and it a traditional cutoff point
in peace duration literature.It allows enough time for actors to begin implementing terms
of the agreement.85 Further research may want to apply varying cutoff points to determine
success but it is outside the scope of this thesis. While the original UCDP dataset measured
it in terms of whether the conflict restarted (1= yes, restarted; 0=no), the variable DyVi05
was renamed to noconf_5 and was rearranged - where 0= conflict restarted and 1= no
conflict for 5 years - for easier interpretation.
Independent Variables
The main purpose of the study is to determine the effectiveness of organizations in
crafting peace agreements and creating long lasting peace. It naturally follows that the
independent variable would determine which third party was central to the creation of the
agreement. Though this might seem to be a simple coding matter, most attempts to end
international conflicts are undertaken by multiple organizations from the individual states
to the United Nations. The information for my coding was recoded from the textual
information within the UCDP Peace Dataset; however, even within the dataset there were

Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, (NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 53.
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multiple third parties listed for one agreement.86 Using the comments in the original data
and some independent research, each primary mediator and contributor to the agreement
was determined.
The following are the resulting categories for party3_type:
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.

None
State or ad hoc groups
Regional Organizations
United Nations
Other

Of the original 215 cases, there were only 9 cases primarily handled by ad-hoc
groups. If the coding for party3_type were to include an ad-hoc group category, the number
of cases within each category would have rendered the variable useless as a measure. By
separating the cases into regional and non-regional, the number of cases was acceptable
without affecting the integrity of the study.
Within SPSS, which was used to analyze the data, there is a category option that
allows nominal variables to be run as one variable without having to create a dummy for
each category. It automatically creates a reference variable – in the case of party3_type it
was “None” – and runs all other options against it.
Category 1 encompasses single state involvement as well as involvement from nonregional ad-hoc groups. For example, if the United States and the UK were the primary
mediators in a conflict in Asia, they would be included under category 1 because they are
neither a regional organization nor an ad hoc group made up of states in Asia. Whether it is
Högbladh, “Peace agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset.” in States in
Armed Conflict 2011, edited by Pettersson Therése and Lotta Themnér, 39-56. Upsalla University: Department
of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99, 2012.
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a state or an ad-hoc group of outside states, the category still encompasses the idea that
“outsiders” will be less likely to produce an agreement that results in a longer duration of
peace.
Similarly, category 2 not only encompasses regional organizations but also regional
ad-hoc groups. Although this may seem to affect the core idea that regional organizations
are the most effective, the inclusion of regional ad-hoc groups within this category also
does not affect the study. Hypotheses 1 through 4 addresses the effects of geographical and
cultural proximity of regional organizations to a conflict. Regional ad-hoc groups also
possess these traits. ECOMOG at its beginning was a regional ad-hoc group under the
leadership of ECOWAS.87 Although the institutionalization hypothesis (5) does not apply to
regional ad-hoc groups, this hypothesis is not tested quantitatively; therefore, the inclusion
of regional ad-hoc groups to category 2 will not affect the results of the regressions.
The UCDP dataset also included a variable for the incompatibility between the
dyads. Their categories established whether the incompatibility was over territory or
government but did not address whether the incompatibilities were over ethnicity or
religion. Using Sambanis’ classifications that included ethnic and religious wars, some of
the cases within the dataset were re-coded accordingly.88
a) Inc – The incompatibility present in the conflict. In order to test the fourth
hypothesis, all conflicts were examined for the parties’ statement of what the
conflict was about as well as other analyses and categorized into the
following:
0. Ethnic/Religious
Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2000), 142.
88 Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” 447-449.
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1. Territory
2. Government
Control Variables
a) conf_death – Confirmed battle deaths within a conflict between start of
conflict and year of peace agreement. Information obtained from PRIO Battle
Deaths Dataset, version 3. The numbers estimated are taken from the “best
estimate” section of the dataset.89 Conflict deaths were chosen in lieu of
length of conflict because it is a more accurate depiction of conflict intensity.
b) Batdeathdum – Dummy variable for conf_death.
1. less than 1,000 deaths
2. Over 1,000 deaths
c) Region – The regional location of the conflict. Variable is thought to affect
results because the majority of conflicts and peace agreements within the
dataset are located in Africa and the Middle East.90
1. Americas
2. Europe
3. Middle East – Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Syria, Turkey, states in Arabian Peninsula.
4. Asia
5. Africa – Geographical location, excludes states in Middle East
d) Cease – Binary variable that asks if the agreement included a ceasefire clause
or article. Variable intended to measure the second and third hypotheses.91
1. The agreement did not include articles for a ceasefire
2. The agreement included articles for a ceasefire.
e) Out_iss – “Are there any outstanding issues specified in the agreement?” 92
Intended to measure the second hypotheses, this variables categorizes
whether outstanding issues, based upon the incompatibility, were dealt with
at the time of the agreement.
1. Agreement did not specify or include outstanding issues
2. Agreement is one of several in a process to be finalized in last
agreement.
3. Agreement iterated outstanding issues.
4. Commission to oversee central issue to incompatibility
Lacina and Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat.”
Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 2
91 Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 6
92 Högbladh, “Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0,” 10
89
90
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5. New negotiations or talks provided for.
6. Agenda for negotiations or provisions outlined for future
agreement.
f) Outlin – Outlining peace process.93
1. No outline for a negotiating agenda including negotiations on
the incompatibility, included in agreement.
2. Outline for negotiating agenda, including negotiations on
incompatibility, included in agreement.
g) PKO – Did the agreement provide for a deployment of a peacekeeping
operation?94
1. No
2. Yes

Regressions and Results
Hypotheses Results
Because hypothesis 1 is tested qualitatively, the first regression tests hypothesis 2.
In order to test hypothesis 2, 3rd party type, outstanding issues, and whether or not the
agreement included negotiations on the incompatibility were included in the regression.
The results, reported in Table 2, show that of the third party types, only regional
organizations had significant effects (.027). In comparison to no third party involvement,
regional organizations are 3.494 times more likely to craft a peace agreement that is
followed for at least five years. Despite, the other third party types not achieving
significance, a comparison of the odds still holds that regional organizations are the most
likely of all the options to achieve this result.; not only that, but the involvement of the
United Nations actually decreased the chance for peace duration.
93
94
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Above the variables in the equation, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test and the
Classification Table illustrate the strength of the model. The model correctly predicts the
outcomes 71.2% of the time, a 13.1% increase over the null model. Because R2 is only
appropriate for linear regression, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test is utilized; contrary to
usual significance tests, a significance over .05 indicates a fit model.
Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2.
Model Summary
-2 Log likelihood

Step

Cox & Snell R
Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
1
251.108a
.174
.235
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter
estimates changed by less than .001.
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step
Chi-square
df
Sig.
8.124
7
.322
1
Classification Tablea
Observed

Step 1
a.

Conflict in 5 years?

Conflict
Absence of conflict

Overall Percentage
The cut value is .500

N=215

B

Predicted
Conflict in 5 years?
Percentage Correct
Conflict
Absence of conflict
106
19
84.8
43
47
52.2
71.2

Variables in the Equation
S.E.
Wald
11.366
.647
.421
2.363
1.251
.566
4.885

party3_type
State(1)
Regional
Organizations(2)
United Nations(3)
-.745
.494
Other(4)
.847
.506
Out_iss
Step 1a
Process to finalize
2.244
.465
Spelled out
.659
.554
To commission
-.078
.619
New negotiations
.842
.549
Agenda for future
2.485
.807
Outlin
.060
.384
Constant
-1.712
.413
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Outlin.
b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
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2.274
2.797
29.930
23.271
1.416
.016
2.348
9.487
.025
17.197

df
4
1
1

Sig.
.023*
.124
.027*

1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.132
.094
.000***
.000***
.234
.900
.125
.002**
.875
.000***

Exp(B)
1.910
3.494
.475
2.332
9.432
1.933
.925
2.320
12.000
1.062
.181

In addition to the finding for regional organizations, the table also shows an
interesting finding for agreements that include discussions on outstanding issues. For
agreements that are part of a process (not a full and final agreement between the
conflicting parties), those issues that are set to be finalized in the last agreement
(Out_iss(1)) have roughly a 9 times greater chance of prolonging the peace for at least five
years. Agreements that lay out a negotiating agenda for those issues to be addressed in a
future agreement (Out_iss (5)) increase the chance by 12 times. At a .000 and .002
significance, respectively, these findings are strong.
Although not an innate part of hypothesis two, this result indicates that partial
agreements, such as an initial ceasefire agreement in order to negotiate a final agreement
for example, should already specifically address the incompatibility between the parties
and have a rough plan on how to approach and address said incompatibility. Although the
other options in the Out_iss variable were not statistically significant, the majority of them
increase the chances for peace duration.
The next regression tests Hypothesis 4 – regional organizations will be less
successful at intractable issues such as ethnic, ideological, or religious conflicts. As seen in
Table 3, regional organizations and “other” organizations are, despite not falling within
traditional measures of significance, are relatively likely to have an effect on the dependent
variable. Their presence roughly increases the chance of peace by about 2 times when
compared to a lack of a third party.
Interestingly, the incompatibilities are significant, meaning that when controlling
for third parties, territorial disputes decrease the chances for an agreement to end in peace
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(by .268 times), followed by governmental disputes (by .459 times). This indicates that, out
of the incompatibility categories, dyads that were conflicting over intractable issues and
come to an agreement have a higher chance to comply with agreement terms for at least
five years. This finding can occur for many reasons that are outside the scope of this
research; however, the reasoning for these results is explored further in the study.
Table 3: Logistic Regression for Hypothesis 4
Model Summary
-2 Log likelihood
Cox & Snell R
Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
1
280.374a
.054
.073
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter
estimates changed by less than .001.
Step

Step
1

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Chi-square
df
4.952
7

Sig.
.666

Classification Tablea
Observed

Step 1

Predicted
Conflict in 5 years?
Conflict
Absence of conflict
90
35
47
43

Conflict
Absence of conflict

Conflict in 5 years?

Percentage
Correct
72.0
47.8
61.9

Overall Percentage
a. The cut value is .500

N=215

B

Variables in the Equation
S.E.
Wald
df

party3_type
State/s
.225
.376
Regional Org./Ad.843
.526
hoc
.084
.466
Step 1a United Nations
Other
.741
.456
Territory
-1.317
.455
Government
-.779
.347
Constant
.019
.307
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Inc.
b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000

Sig.

Exp(B)

95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower
Upper

4.416
.359

4
1

.353
.549

1.253

.599

2.618

2.562

1

.109

2.323

.828

6.519

.032
2.635
8.373
5.039
.004

1
1
1
1
1

.857
.105
.004**
.025*
.951

1.088
2.098
.268
.459
1.019

.436
.858
.110
.232

2.711
5.131
.654
.906
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Additional Regression Results
In addition to testing the two hypotheses, alternate variables were included in order
to study their effect on the dependent variable. The first regression was a full model with
nine independent variables: 3rd party type, region of conflict, provisions for ceasefire,
provisions for cultural freedoms, provisions for peace keeping operations, battle deaths,
and whether there were outstanding issues and whether the incompatibility was outlined.
Of those, 3rd party type, and outstanding issues had significant effect; specifically, regional
organizations were significant at .011, agreements that are part of a process for finalization
at a later date was significant at .000, and agreements that outlined a negotiating agenda
from a future agreement was significant at .002.
The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables,
regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that is not broken
for at least 5 years.95 The return of significance on regional organizations with the addition
of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis 2. It also reinforces the theory in
general.
Eight separate regressions were run in order to combine 3rd party type and each of
the remaining variables. Of those, significant results for a third party were present when
controlling for region and outstanding issues. When controlling for region, regional
organizations are almost three times more likely to produce a peace agreement that last
five years96 and when controlling for outstanding issues, almost 3.5 times more likely.97
Table 4.
Appendix A: Table 5.
97 Appendix A: Table 6.
95
96
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Of the twenty two regressions which combined two non-repeatable variables with
3rd party type, seven returned significant results for regional organizations, ranging from
peace agreements 2.998 times to 4.799 times more likely to last five years. Overall, the
results show that regional organizations do make a substantial difference in the success of
peace agreements in keeping the peace. Ranging for two to five times more likely to achieve
the desired measure (peace for five years), regional organizations outperform the United
Nations, individual states, and non-regional ad-hoc groups.
From the results, it is also clear that incompatibility is important and territorial
disputes are generally the most difficult to resolve. The reasons for this result are several.
First, mandated in several regional organizations, as well as the UN, is the respect for
sovereignty of member states. When faced with a territorial dispute, organizations are by
default required to seek out an outcome that keeps the initial borders of the state. As will
be presented in Moldova’s case, the OSCE was primarily concerned with keeping the Soviet
Era borders despite Transdniestria’s desire to become an autonomous state. This is not
always the primary reason for involvement, however, it adds an aspect to a regional
organizations involvement that can be more difficult to solve.
Alternatively, the territorial dispute could also be imbued with intractable
characteristics. A common example is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it is a territorial
conflict, the land is imbued with religious and ethnic values that only add to the already

98
99

Appendix A: Table 7.
Appendix A: Table 8.

34

immense complexity of the conflict. In terms of the fourth hypothesis, the null cannot be
rejected, as none of the third parties yielded statistically significant results.
Table 4: Full Model Logistic Regression
Step
1

-2 Log likelihood

Model Summary
Cox & Snell R Square
a
189.722
.302

Nagelkerke R Square
.405

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot be found.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Chidf
Sig.
square
14.902
8

Step
1

.061
Variables in the Equation
B
S.E.
Wald

N=189

party3_type
State
Regional Org
United Nations
Other

Step 1a

4

.036

.029
6.530
1.041
1.099

1
1
1
1

.866
.011
.308
.295

95% C.I.for
EXP(B)
Lower Upper

.911
6.728
.536
1.870

.311 2.674
1.559 29.028
.162 1.775
.580 6.025
3.280 36.778
.338 6.929
.341 7.527
.842 13.943
2.895 97.963

19.649

5

.001

2.396
.425
.471
1.231
2.824

.617 15.103
.771
.304
.790
.355
.716 2.956
.898 9.879

1
1
1
1
1

.000 10.983
.582 1.529
.551 1.601
.086 3.426
.002 16.840

3.418

2

.181

1.046
3.381
2.500
.224
.543
1.517

1
1
1
1
1
1

.307
.066
.114
.636
.461
.218

4.082

4

.395

-.732
-.924
-1.559
.234
.357
.697

.716
.502
.986
.495
.484
.566

Region

.481
.397
.210
1.264
1.429
2.008

.118
.148
.030
.479
.553
.662

1.956
1.063
1.453
3.337
3.693
6.088

.000

.

.000

1

.999

.000

Middle East
Asia
Africa
>1000 deaths

11757.037
20.784
1.638
1.005
.227
.794
-.095
.698
-.002
.452

2.657
.082
.018
.000

1
1
1
1

.103
.775
.892
.996

5.147
1.255
.909
.998

Constant

-1.422

2.786

1

.095

.241

Europe

a.
b.

10.292

Exp(B)

.549
.746
.611
.597

Inc
Territory
Government
Provisions for cultural freedom
Ceasefire provision
Outline to address Inc
Peacekeeping Operation

Sig.

-.093
1.906
-.623
.626

Out_iss
Process to finalize
Spelled out
Delegated to commission
New negotiations
Agenda for future

df

.852

Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Inc, Cul, cease, Outlin, PKO, Region, batdeathdum.

p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
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.718 36.918
.265 5.944
.232 3.570
.412 2.418

Implications
These results suggest several policy prescriptions. First, regional organizations and
regional ad-hoc groups, in general, should be involved in solving conflicts within their
region, as they are shown to be significant actors in creating a durable peace agreement.
However, not all regional organizations are currently equipped to properly handle conflict,
due to lack of finances or military capability, which will be illustrated in the case studies.
These organizations should be assisted in order to have the means to respond to such
conflicts when and if they arrive.
As the counterintuitive results from incompatibility shows, there should be more
attention directed towards territorial and governmental disputes because these
agreements are more likely to fail in their infancy. As discussed before, this could be due to
several factors that are outside the scope this study. That being said, these results open up
several avenues for further study on the side of academia. Further studies should
investigate cross-organizational involvement in territorial disputes and their efficacy.
Some control variables were also significant. First, full agreements should address
all aspects of the incompatibility between dyads. However, if the agreement is part of a
process, any issues not resolved within the scope of that agreement should have a formal
outline on how to approach it in a later agreement. Under the full model, outstanding issues
that had a clear agenda to be addressed with a future agreement raised the chances for
durable peace nearly 17 times.100

100

Table 4.
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The case studies in the following chapter address some of the questions that
resulted from the empirical research. Additional variables such as the life span of an
organization and the terms included in the agreements are taken into account and applied
to three conflicts. The importance of this addition, aside from theoretically providing
greater evidence, is the examination of these variables in action and what implications they
create for policy towards regional organizations and the policies of regional organizations.
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CHAPTER FOUR – CASE STUDIES

This chapter applies the previous variables and new variables that were not
quantifiable to three separate cases. The first two cases will be from Africa, particularly
from West Africa and were mediated largely by the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and their peacekeeping arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).
The final case will investigate the secessionist conflict in Moldova and the role of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in securing a ceasefire.
ECOWAS was selected as one of the organizations because it has been involved in
many conflicts since its creation. Africa is a commonly utilized as a base for several case
studies, the most common being the Liberian Civil War.101 The first case study will be Sierra
Leone. During their civil war, four ceasefires/peace agreements were reached; only the
final agreement, the Abuja Accord, held for five years. In order to test the role one of the
variables (life span), two agreements will be tested: the Lomé Agreement of 1999 and the
Abuja Accord signed in 2000. The purpose of the two agreements is to compare a failure to
a success while controlling for the time span and the state in order to address the
specificity of agreement terms and changes within the organization.
The other case is Guinea-Bissau and their agreement in 1998, also known as the
Abuja Accord. The terms of agreement are different from both the Lomé and Abuja
agreements in Sierra Leone although the incompatibility is the same. Furthermore, external
See Jeremy Weinstein “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005): 598-624; Michaela Matter and Burcu Savun, “Information, Agreement Design, and
the Durability of Civil War Settlements,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (2010): 511-524. for
some.
101
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circumstances are different, particularly regarding the role of Nigeria within ECOMOG,
which affects the examination of hypothesis 5 and institutionalism.
Moldova was selected as the OSCE case for several reasons. Despite being in a
separate continent, Moldova also struggled with imposed borders that connected a
population that was widely varied in ethnicity, history, and ideology. At the time of the
signing of the agreement between Moldova and Transdniestria, the OSCE was “older” than
ECOWAS at its involvement in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. This difference allows for
further investigation of hypothesis five. Finally, the OSCE had to content with Russia’s
involvement in the conflict, both as an outside actor and as a member state of the OSCE.
This not only affected the level of partiality of the OSCE, but also hypothesis three in terms
of enforcement of the agreement.
Finally, all of the peace agreements were drafted within a similar time span,
between 1997 and 2000. Although a variety of time periods could be explored, examining
peace agreements that were drafted close together lessens the probability of major world
events affecting one outcome and not another. For example, the approaches of regional
organizations may have changed in post 9/11 world.
The quantitative results in the previous chapter show that regional organizations do
have a significant effect on the success of peace agreements. Case studies are also an
important addition to the research because they provide a “detailed examination of an
aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be

39

generalizable to other events.”102 Jack Levy identifies six types of case studies from those
that are ends and of themselves to those that test theories.103 This study focuses on the
latter. The combination of explicit hypothesis, stated previously, along with what aspects of
the case studies are falsifiable, make the agreements presented viable theory testing
cases.104
While John Stuart Mill called for comparable cases that were similar in all but one
aspect, critics stated that the large numbers of cases are far too complex and riddled with
interactions to practically be compared in this fashion.105 Despite this, the selection of cases
within this study attempt to overcome these difficulties and select cases that are capable of
being tested accurately. Finally, while quantitative results bring new developments for
academics to further test and develop, case studies can bring an application of these
findings that can serve as tangible examples for policy makers.
The remainder of this chapter includes the list of variables to be added for analysis
and includes standards for rejecting the null. The two cases handled by ECOWAS are
examined and include a background of the conflict, a discussion of the peace agreements
and the application of the variables in order to test the hypotheses. The section for OSCE
follows and is set up similarly. If a case study ends in a failure of the peace agreement, as in
Guinea Bissau and the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone, the hypotheses will still be

Alexander L. George, “Case studies and Theory Development,” in Diplomacy: new Approaches in Theory,
History, and Policy, ed. Paul Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68.
103 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies and Conflict Resolution,” in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob
Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 73-75.
104 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies and Conflict Resolution,” 74.
105 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies and Conflict Resolution,” 75.
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examined; however, an additional examination of potential reasons for the failure will also
be undertaken. Finally, implications for policy will be included.

Variables
In order to design a viable case study design, the variables described in the
quantitative section in addition to the non-quantifiable variables must be falsifiable. While
the quantitative variables have already shown to be so, the falsifiability of the qualitative
variables is explained below.
Agreement Terms (AT) – The terms of the formal agreement between conflicting
dyads will be examined. If the terms of the agreement address the stated
incompatibility (Inc) between parties, then the null can be rejected. This
variable will be an additional measure to test hypothesis two and hypothesis
4. If the agreement terms do not directly address the incompatibility, then a
section regarding outstanding issues will be searched for. If there is no such
section in the formal agreement, then the null cannot be rejected.
Life Span (ls) – Life span is a proxy for institutionalization. The longer time between
an institutions formation and its involvement in a conflict, the more likely
that the agreement will result in a durable peace of no less than five years.
Although this measure could be quantitative, the n would be too small for
proper testing.
Partiality – This variable initially was meant to be names “bias” but this term evokes
a negative connotation. As stated in Hypothesis 1, the term partiality in this
case is positive because it relates to “insider-partiality”, meaning that the
mediators are from the conflict area and have higher stakes in the results.
The negative connotation of “bias” should be applied to organizations that
are “outcome partial” and have the desire to see one actor prevail over
another.
Should an organization be seen to have only insider-partiality, then
the higher the chances for lasting peace. Conversely, should an organization
be seen as outcome partial, such as ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, then not only
41

will it not raise the chances for peace, there is a likelihood of the chances
being reduced. Due to the inability of this variable being quantified
effectively, it can only be measured by investigating the perceptions of those
being mediated.
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Established by the Lagos Treaty in 1975, ECOWAS was not initially intended to be a
peacekeeping or monitoring organization. As its name suggests, the organization was
meant to foster economic integration and developing towards the final goal of an economic
union among the West African states, thus promoting economic – and potentially political –
stability. According to other scholars, however, ECOWAS was also an attempt by Nigeria to
spread its influence in the region. 106
Despite repeated attempts, these goals have not been achieved. West Africa was
considered to be the most violent area of the African continent with a long history of coups
and civil wars. Because of the security situation, ECOWAS slowly began incorporating
peace and security in its mandate starting in 1978 with the Non-aggression Treaty; this led
to the Mutual Assistance and Defence Protocol in 1986107 and culminated with the creation
of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990
as a result of the ongoing Liberian Civil War.108

Tavares, Regional Security, 15.
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The Protocal of Non-Aggression (1978) called for members to “refrain from the
threat or use of force or aggression” against one another.109 The protocol failed to provide
any institutional mechanisms should any breaches occur, rendering it at best, idealistic.
The mutual Assistance and Defense (MAD) Protocol attempted to remedy this oversight
and formed a binding commitment requiring members to provide assistance in the event of
external aggression or internal conflicts that were “engineered or supported from the
outside.”110 The protocol pushed ECOWAS further into the realm of peacekeeping but was
still focused on protecting states from external threats. The protocol also created the
Defence Council, the Defence Committee and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community
(AAFC) as response mechanisms to threats; however, these institutions were not
implemented, in large part due to the divide between the Anglophone and the Francophone
member states. The divide, fueled by suspicions of Nigeria’s (Anglophone) ambitions
towards hegemonic status, would continue to cause problems for ECOWAS in their
responses to the wave of conflicts in the 1990s.111
With the Liberian crisis in 1989, ECOWAS felt that its involvement was necessary
and created and deployed ECOMOG, an intervention force with soldiers from Ghana, Sierra
Leone, Gambia, Nigeria and Guinea. A full analysis will not take place, but ECOMOG’s
mission was to prevent Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

Quoted in Isabel Meyer, ECOWAS: The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (Munich: GRIN Publishing GmbH, 2009), 4.
110 John M. Kabia, “Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding: The ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture,”
(paper presented at the BISA-Africa and International Studies ESRC seminar series: African Agency in
International Politics, University of Birmingham, Alabama, April 7, 2011).
111 Kabia, “Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding.” African Union, accessed June 3, 2013, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/recs/ECOWASProfile.pdf
109

43

from overthrowing President Samuel Doe’s regime. ECOMOG’s intervention enhanced the
split between Francophone and Anglophone countries because of the Francophone’s
opposition to the intervention. The result was Taylor’s victory in the subsequent elections
and his involvement in Sierra Leone.112
Even with major funding and manpower from Nigeria, ECOMOG faced serious
challenges of manpower, coordination and finances.113 Several of these challenges were
created because of a lack of unity within ECOWAS which was exemplified in Liberia when
some Francophone countries (Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) provided support to the
NPFL.114 Furthermore, the protocols, agreements and treaties leading to the creation to
ECOMOG envisioned an organization that would counter interstate conflict and had little
measures in place for intrastate conflicts, which made up a majority of conflicts in West
Africa during the 1990’s, including Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.115

Sierra Leone
The Sierra Leone conflict was, in many ways, a spillover of the Liberian Civil War. In
1991, former army corporal Foday Sankoh and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
began a rebellion with support from Charles Taylor from Liberia, and Col. Qadafi from
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Libya.116 In response to President Momoh’s support of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia,
Taylor had threatened to bring the war to Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. The
invading guerrilla group was made up of both Sierra Leonean fighters and some members
of the force in Liberia. The RUF later also admitted that they had received military and
financial support from Taylor.117 Feeling that General Momoh was neglecting them, the
Sierra Leonean army staged a coup in 1992 and placed Captain Valentine Strasser as head
of the new military junta. Despite Strasser’s initial attempts to broker a peace with the RUF,
the war continued.118
The government of Sierra Leone proved to be unable to counter the threat. Though
the SLA’s number had swelled, the lack of training proved to be a major hindrance to
success. In addition, large sections of the “army” were suspected of taking advantage of the
chaos by looting and extorting citizens.119 After Strasser attempted to run for president
again, despite his pledge not to, on January 1996, Brigadier Maada Bio staged a successful
coup d’état.120 The coup was strongly condemned internationally and under immense
external pressure, elections were held, making Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, from the Sierra Leone
Peoples Party (SLPP) President.121
During Kabbah’s presidency, the Abidjan Accord was signed. Brokered by Côte
d’Ivoire, on November 30, 1996, the accord called for disarmament and repatriation of
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rebel fighters, the transformation of the RUF into a political party and granted blanket
amnesty for war crimes.122 The peace did not hold, primarily due to the lack of enforcement
mechanisms. In May 1997, during an attempted coup, former Major Johnny Koromah was
broken out of prison and began to lead the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).
Koromah was a member of the group that attempted the September 1996 coup on Kabbah.
Though he had resisted several past coup attempts,123 President Kabbah’s government
eventually fell to Koromah and he was forced to flee the country.124
Soon after the coup, the AFRC formed an alliance with the RUF, their alleged
enemies during the civil war.125 In 1998, the junta, made up of the RUF and the AFRC, was
removed from power by ECOMOG. ECOMOG reinstated President Kabbah but he was
unable to keep control and the RUF nearly took Freetown. ECOMOG again was able to
defeat RUF forces; however, it was unable to destroy them. The heavy fighting left
Freetown and most of the country in ruin. Despite firm domestic protest against dealings
with the RUF, Kabbah wavered under international pressure to enter into new
negotiations.126
A pseudo-mediation attempt by ECOWAS resulted in the Conakry Agreement in
October 1998. Tom Ikimi, the Nigerian foreign minister, reportedly stated that he was not
there to negotiate with the RUF; he was only interested in setting up a timetable for their
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withdrawal or they would be “flushed out of Freetown.”127 Though the agreement called
for a cessation of hostilities and a timeline for returning Kabbah to the Presidency by the
following April, the junta soon reneged on the agreement and stated they would remain in
power until 2001.128 The junta’s refusal to honor the agreement indicated that they were
simply buying time in order to regroup.129 In this obvious one-sided stance from Nigeria,
the agreement did not hold and clashes continued between the sides. In terms of the
partiality hypothesis, despite Nigeria’s relational partiality, it was clearly also outcome
partial, which is not useful towards achieving a viable agreement.130
Following this failure, sanctions enacting an embargo on Sierra Leone were put in
place. Although in technical terms, the sanctions were successful in blocking arms trades to
the AFRC, ECOMOG also suffered from international criticism from its overzealousness,
specifically on blocking and shelling humanitarian vessels.131 Attacks by the AFRC and the
RUF continued until March 1999 when a ceasefire was signed in order to discuss a solution.
Finally, the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed in July 1999.132

The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999
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There were eight years and roughly 14,000 battle related deaths between the
outbreak of conflict and the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement.133 Although there is no
certain number of civilian deaths measure for that span of time, according to the United
Nations Development Program, roughly 70,000 casualties occurred between 1991 and
2002 as a result of the civil war.134 Therefore, it can be assumed that there were over
14,000 battle deaths between 1991 and 1999. The Lomé Peace Agreement was mediated
through ECOWAS with the assistance of Francis Okelo, Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General in Sierra Leone.
As in previous peace talks, the RUF demanded a power-sharing agreement which
would place them in a transitional government for a period of no less than four years; a
condition also encouraged by Taylor.135 In addition, they demanded blanket amnesty for all
war crimes and the immediate departure of foreign troops within 14 days of the signing of
any agreement. Finally, the RUF demanded the unconditional release and pardon to Sankoh
and the opportunity for the RUF to become a legitimate political party.136 As seen in the
discussion of the actual peace agreement, the RUF were given the majority of their
demands.
The government, in contrast, held a conference organized by the National
Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. Those in attendance stressed Kabbah’s
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legitimacy as President and stated that the Abidjan and Conkary agreements should be the
basis for peace. There was a strong opposition to any form of power-sharing with the RUF;
however, the final agreement did allow for a shared government.137
During the agreement talks, which lasted six weeks, the disagreements regarding
Sankoh’s freedom and the RUF’s idea of a transitional power-sharing government proved
to be the items with most contention.138 Because both parties were encouraged to have
direct talks, the discussions were heated, often resulting in public outbursts – usually by
the RUF. When an impasse did occur, Gnassingbe Eyadema, ECOWAS’ chairman, was called
to help mediate the impasse towards an agreement.139
When the agreement was signed by all parties, it included articles for a ceasefire and
ceasefire monitoring (detailing what exactly ceasefire violations are), inclusion of the RUF
in the governance by making it a political party and giving pardon to all members “…in
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing
of the present Agreement.”140 The agreement also redefined ECOMOG’s and UNOMSIL’s
mandate to one of peacekeeping and addressed human rights issues – particularly in
respect of child soldiers. Perhaps most importantly, the death sentence for Sankoh was
lifted. Despite these concessions, the peace agreement was still a failure and the question of
why remains.
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In order to view the variables more simply, they were: 3rd party type – regional
organization; conf_death – 14,000; Region – Africa; Inc – government; Cease – Yes; Out_iss –
No outstanding issues; Outlin – No; Lifespan – 16 years for ECOWAS, 9 years for ECOMOG;
Agreement Terms: Yes, matched incompatibility; PKO – Yes. When comparing these
variables to the quantitative section, most of the variables made this conflict conducive to
being able to hold peace at least five years post-peace agreement.
Hypothesis 1 addressed the role of partiality and “bias” in third party mediation. In
Sierra Leone, this was initially apparent during the Abidjan Accord due to Sankoh’s
repeated statements of having little trust for the UN Special Envoy, Berhanu Dinka.141
Furthermore, in October 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
dispatched 6,000 peacekeeping troops to the area to assist ECOMOG in disarmament, as
agreed upon under Article II of the Lomé Agreement. Sankoh claimed that the agreement
never specified the use of UN peacekeeping troops and his close commander, Sam Bockarie,
added that the UN presence was damaging to the peace process.142
Sankoh’s mistrust was not a new phenomenon. During the talks for the Abidjan
accord, Sankoh refused to speak to the UN special envoy and displayed mistrust of the UN
in general.143 His mistrust for the UN stemmed from a fear of UN bias against him144 but
also from doubting the UN’s ability to protect him; a doubt that began “as far back as the
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betrayal and assassination of Congo’s Patrice Lumumba in the 1960s and of Samuel Doe in
Liberia.”145 In this regard, the view of the UN as an unwanted outsider is present.
These statements alone are not enough to reject the null because although they
show mistrust of the UN, they do not show whether the RUF was more open to ECOMOG’s
involvement. In fact, although relational partiality, where the actor has a relationship with
all disputants, is generally a positive addition to the bargaining table, it has been claimed
that ECOMOG had outcome partiality, where the actor has a preference as to which party in
the conflict should “win”; this became particularly apparent after Charles Taylor became
president of Liberia in 1997. Liberian fighters were commonly seen fighting alongside RUF
members seemingly making the Sierra Leone war the next stage for the conflict between
Nigeria, also the head contributor to ECOWAS, and Liberia since the Liberian Civil War. 146
Furthermore, there were serious allegations that Nigeria was benefitting from the illegal
diamond economy, affecting their stance regarding the war’s outcome.147 Therefore, the
null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected in this case.
The initial causes for the outbreak of Sierra Leone’s civil war are still debated. Sierra
Leone is a state rich with natural resources, including diamonds. This gives rise to a
speculation about resource based conflict, which under the variables listings would make
the conflict one over territory since the goal would be to control the diamond rich areas.
Furthermore, although Sierra Leone had these resources, the country was still one of the
poorest in the world. Several authors have examined the role of greed and grievances in
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conflicts,148 and even the former Finance Minister of Sierra Leone stated that “…the war in
Sierra Leone is simply about diamonds.”149
However, as much as Sierra Leone’s resources may have been fuelled by diamonds,
the RUF and AFRC’s end goal was to control the government of Sierra Leone, thus the
plentiful amount of coups. Furthermore, the ineptitude of Sierra Leone’s previous
government leaders had led to the economic drop that further opened the door for
rebellion and civil war.150
As the Lomé agreement was meant to be a full and final agreement, there were no
outstanding issues and no outline for a negotiating agenda was necessary. The conflict was
about government control and the agreement addressed the incompatibility by not only
granting amnesty to combatants – a highly contested topic-151, but also by making the RUF
into a legitimate political party. In relation to hypothesis 2, which related to the specificity
of agreement terms, these circumstances should have increased the likelihood of the
success of the peace agreement except in one respect; the agreement provided no
specifications for the consequences of breaching the ceasefire or the agreement in general.
ECOMOG’s lack of specificity on the enforcement issue could have been a direct result of
Nigeria’s desire to pull out of the conflict.
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Despite its interest in the defeat of the RUF, Nigeria, and ECOMOG by default, was
anxious to decrease the amount of troops and money it had committed internationally.152
This desire led not only to accords that, according to some, “…appease[d] local warlords by
giving them political power in exchange for military peace,” and were an “…open invitation
of warlords to enjoy the spoils of office in a giant jumble sale of national wares”153, but also
to a lack of enthusiasm and willingness to enforce the Lomé Agreement when it was
breached.
Soon after the agreement was signed, ECOMOG informed UN Secretary Annan that it
would begin withdrawing its troops, effectively leaving an untrained UNAMSIL force as the
primary peacekeepers. 154 By May 2000, over 500 blue-helmet peacekeepers were
kidnapped and many other were killed, leading to British intervention and a significant
increase of forces.155 Therefore, it seems that ECOMOG and UNAMSIL were unwilling, illprepared, or unable to enforce the agreement. In ECOMOG’s case, it appears to be a mixture
of unwillingness and lack of capacity.
Hypothesis four predicted that intractable issues would be significantly more
difficult to culminate into a strong peace agreement due to the volatile nature of such
conflicts. Quantitative results showed; however, that tractable issues – namely conflicts
over territory-, are the least likely to end in lasting peace, closely followed by conflicts over
government. Deroun et al found that one possibility for this is how agreements approach
compromising on the incompatibility - through sharing positions in government, or
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“political power-sharing.”156 Although it is only applied to intrastate conflicts and the
results did not reach conventional measure of statistical significance, Derouen, et al., found
that political power-sharing actually decreases the likelihood of peace duration.157
Although the results of this study indicated that territory causes the most decrease in peace
duration rather than government, as in Deroun et al.’s study, the consensus in the results is
that tractable issues are the most difficult to overcome. Hypothesis four’s null cannot be
rejected in this case.
Finally, hypothesis five addresses the institutionalization of a regional organization
and predicts that regional organizations that are more institutionalized will be more likely
to craft an agreement that elongates the duration of peace. For the purposes of this article,
this was measured by calculating the lifespan of the organization from inception until the
beginning on the conflict. In the case of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS had been established for 16
years; however, ECOMOG had only been established for a short time and only had previous
experience in Liberia when it became involved in Sierra Leone’s war.
As Haftel and Thompson point out in their study, international organizations gain
more independence over time; specifically, for every year of existence, the independence of
an international organization increases by .075.158 By this measurement, ECOMOG has very
little independence and is much less likely to be effective. ECOWAS has been documented
several times as being uncoordinated, decentralized, and incapable of forming a central,
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unified command structure.159 Both Anglo- and Francophone states failed to provide
translators and in 1999, Ghana withdrew its troops during an attack, despite Nigerian
officers’ commands to hold.160 Furthermore, ECOWAS is also seen as a front organization
for Nigeria, its dominant hegemon, in order to project its personal interest in Africa.161 In
addition to lowering its independence, this also damages any reputation that ECOWAS had
as being a legitimate third party, capable of solving conflicts within its scope of interest.
This contributes not only to its failure in Sierra Leone, but potentially in Guinea-Bissau as
well.
Adding to the lack of institutionalism was the obvious rivalry between the
Anglophone and Francophone member states of ECOWAS. Aside from inhibiting ECOWAS’
initial purpose towards economic integration, the rivalry caused logistical problems on the
ground including a dysfunctional central command that gave different orders and generals
were entering the conflict with little to no accurate intelligence. These arguments also
added to the suspicion placed on Nigeria on their true motives for becoming involved in
Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. 162
Several factors contributed to the inevitable downfall of the Lomé Peace Agreement.
Nigeria’s bias within ECOMOG was perhaps the most serious because not only did it make it
more difficult to have both parties at the bargaining table, it also made the Nigerian troops
within ECOMOG a party to the conflict, effective destroying their reputation. In addition,
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political power-sharing agreements are notoriously difficult to adhere to by both parties.163
In Sierra Leone this caused a greater problem because of the equal backlash of the
international community.164 As Francis stated, “The Lomé Accord is a product of a hastily
negotiated peace settlement, preoccupied with short-term objectives and flossing over
issues of justice and the fundamental grievances that led to the war.”165 The May crisis
discussed earlier was a clear indicator of the lack of commitment of the RUF to the Lomé
Peace Agreement.
Furthermore, Nigeria had announced the withdrawal of its ECOMOG forces in Sierra
Leone prior to the agreement even being signed, sending a clear signal to Sankoh and the
RUF that they did not have to be committed to the agreement.166 The security vacuum left
by Nigeria’s departure and the replacement by ill-trained UN peacekeepers presented the
RUF with a unique “second chance” to regroup and continue the fight. Though Nigeria’s
withdrawal from Sierra Leone after the peace agreement should have encouraged the
adherence to the agreement, as per RUF request, their withdrawal only bolstered RUF
resolve to rebel; this has led to some speculation that the RUF never intended to follow the
agreement at all.167
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The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement (2000) and Abuja Review Agreement (2001)

In response to the RUF’s May attack on UNAMSIL forces, the British dispatched
Special Forces to contain the situation and regain control. The combination of UNAMISIL
and UK presence was not the only deterrence to the RUF; Sankoh was eventually captured
on May 17, 2000168 and the heavy sanctions placed on Liberia severely lessened the RUF’s
power.169 In addition, ECOWAS agreed to return 3,000 troops to Sierra Leone in order to
help quell the unrest and to restart pursuing an agreement to end the conflict, even going
so far as to send representatives to the RUF stronghold.170
By November, a new agreement calling for cessation of hostilities was a much more
viable option than the previous one, partially due to the replacement of Sankoh by Issan
Hassan Sesay, the Interim Leader of the RUF. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on
November 10th, 2000. The RUF was to immediately halt hostilities under article 1(with
breaches clearly explained under article 9), agree to UNAMSIL supervision, monitoring and
taking an active role in disarmament, demobilization and the beginning of reintegration
(DDR) under articles 3, 4, and 7. Both parties had to agree to participate in the review of
the implementation of the agreement, along with the ECOWAS Committee of six of the
Medication and Security Council on Sierra Leone and the UN.171
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In contrast to the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Abuja accords held the peace although
tensions were still high. In terms of the hypotheses, the specificity and enforcement of the
agreement were conducive to its success. The incompatibility remained the same and less
conducive to success. By the year 2000, ECOMOG was a decade old and had experiences in
other conflicts in West Africa. Recalling Haftel and Thompson’s measure, ECOMOG was now
ten times more likely to be an independent, institutionalized organization.
In May 2001, the ECOWAS Committee of Six, the UN, the Government of Sierra
Leone, and the RUF met to review the progress of the Abuja agreement, led by Modibo
Sidibe, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the chairman of the ECOWAS committee.
Despite the ceasefire being maintained since its inception in late 2000, the meeting stated
that the implementation of certain aspects of the ceasefire, such as the return of arms, was
proceeding too slowly.172 Furthermore, though there were technically two violations on the
ceasefire, the meeting found that the RUF was not at fault.173

Guinea-Bissau (1998)
Unlike the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG’s intervention in
Guinea-Bissau was the organizations first mission without the support of Nigeria,
financially and otherwise. Also, unlike Sierra Leone whose natural resources are abundant,
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Guinea-Bissau’s largest earnings from less profitable areas such as fishing.174 Although
Guinea-Bissau had successfully gained its liberation from Portuguese rule in the 1970’s
under Amilcar Cabral, the new administration was quickly wrapped in corruption that
remade the state into a dictatorship under the repressive rule of the Partido Africano da
Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC – African Party for the Independence of
Guinea and Cape Verde).175
In 1980, after 24 years, the army rebelled and staged a coup, inserting Prime
Minister Joao Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira as the new President.176 President Vieira, despite
some posturing to open the political system, was just as oppressive as his predecessor –
torturing opponents and taking full command of the army after disbanding the National
Popular Assembly.177 The eleven month conflict did not erupt, however, until 1998. Vieira
accused his army chief of staff, General Asumane Mané, of illegally selling weapons to
secessionists in Senegal. When Vieira attempted to arrest Mané, the army devolved into
factions, with the majority defecting to Mané’s defense.178
In response, Senegal and Guinea dispatched troops in Guinea-Bissau under
Operation Gabou. Despite both states’ claims that their intervention was legitimate based
on previously signed ‘secret’ defense pacts among the three, this legality was questionable.
The majority of interpretations of the pacts indicated that they called for a response to
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external attacks rather than internal conflicts.179 In addition, the intervention was done
without prior approval from ECOWAS. However, despite the additional troops, Senegal
grossly underestimated the strength of the rebellion and, suffering heavy losses, urged
Vieira to request ECOWAS support.180
In response to Senegal and Guinea dispatching troops, the OAU Central Organ of the
Mechanism of Conflict Prevention endorsed ECOWAS as the central mediator and called for
the UN Security Council to endorse not only ECOWAS involvement but also to legitimize the
legality of Senegal and Guinea’s actions. Vieira also requested ECOWAS involvement in
Guinea-Bissau to assist in subduing the rebels. 181
Although ECOWAS and the Communidade de Países de Língua Franca Portuguesa
(CPLP), led by Portugal, attempted to mediate the situation, strained tensions brought on
by “Franco-Portuguese regional competition formed the basis for mistrust.”182 Both
organizations shared little to no information and proceeded to further separate agendas.
ECOWAS’ obvious favoritism towards Vieira’s government also restricted its ability to
appear as a helpful mediator.
As a result, for the initial stages of mediation, the CPLP took the lead that resulted in
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, formalized on July 25, 1998. The
agreement was made between the government and the rebels but Mane’s direct
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involvement is unknown.183 Primarily, the memorandum called for a ceasefire, a
demilitarized zone and a start to negotiations between the parties. As a condition for sitting
at the negotiating table, the rebels stated that the foreign Senegalese and Guinean troops
had to leave the country. The ceasefire did not address this issue specifically but it did call
for a peacekeeping force led by the CPLP.184 The ceasefire held until October until an
outbreak of heavy fighting, including heavy shelling, in Bissau rendered all progress null.185
The junta forces overtook a large portion of the country, almost overrunning the
presidential palace in Bissau. On October 21st, Vieira declared a ceasefire, which the junta
accepted. Several consecutive meeting followed in which the Vieira and Mane attempted to
come to a consensus. After the two sides were flown to Abuja for the remainder of the talks,
the CPLP took a much smaller role in further negotiations.186
Not until November 1, 1998 was the Abuja Accord signed by both parties, following
a long mediation, described as being littered by “’tough talking’ by the hosts acting as
mediators,”187 by both ECOWAS and the CPLP. Unlike the Lomé Peace Agreement in Sierra
Leone, the Abuja Accord was significantly shorter with only five points including the
withdrawal of foreign troops, an ECOMOG interposition force that would guarantee
security for exiting troops and humanitarian organizations along the Guinea-
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Bissau/Senegal border, installation of a Government of National Unity (that included the
junta), and general and Presidential elections held by March 1999.188
Without explicit terms and instructions, the terms of the mandate soon broke down
due to suspicions from all sides at the involvement of CPLP, ECOMOG, Senegal and Portugal.
In January of 1999, fighting once again broke out, displacing many civilians who had just
returned. However, in February of 1999, a formal ceasefire was signed and the Government
of National Unity was formed. The government only lasted until May of 1999 when Mané
staged a coup, causing Vieira to flee to the Portuguese embassy, then to Lisbon where he
renounced his presidency.189
Mirroring Sierra Leone, ECOMOG did not have sufficient capabilities to handle the
continued fighting between Vieira and Mané. Furthermore, ECOMOG was still suffering
from its debilitating inability to coordinate deployment strategies, commanders and
general logistics.190 Reiterating hypothesis five, ECOMOG is too new of an organization to
be independent of its hegemon, Nigeria. Even with Nigeria’s support, ECOMOG had suffered
from infighting in Sierra Leone. In Guinea-Bissau, without Nigeria’s back-up, ECOMOG
suffered not only from infighting191 but from lack of troops and finances as well.
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There were 11 months and roughly 900 battle deaths192 in the Guinea-Bissau
conflict between its outbreak and the Abuja Accord of 1998. Although some estimates put
civilian deaths in the several thousands, there is no true recorded number. The other
variables include 3rd party type – regional organization; Region – Africa; Inc – government;
Cease – Yes; Out_iss – No outstanding issues; Outlin – No; Lifespan – 23 years for ECOWAS, 8
years for ECOMOG; Agreement Terms: Yes, matched incompatibility; PKO – Yes.
In terms of hypothesis one, it has already been addressed that ECOWAS, and
ECOMOG by default, had little reputation for being neutral. Although insider-partiality has
been claimed to add legitimacy, ECOWAS was accused of having outcome partiality –
working for one side over another. This not only lowered their ability to widen the
bargaining space between combatants, but also added to the difficulties being able to fulfill
the terms of the Abuja agreement. The overarching rivalries between the Anglophone and
Francophone member states also contributed to the bias; this was exacerbated by the
presence of the CPLP who often countered ECOMOG’s position.
Although the terms of the agreement did match the incompatibility between both
parties, the agreement was not specific beyond granting the junta a place in the new
government. In terms of the ceasefire provision, it did not state what constitutes a breach
of the ceasefire, nor did it state ECOMOG’s or CPLP’s response to a breach of the agreement
by either party. Of course, the lack of specification could have reflected ECOMOG’s lack of
capacity in fulfilling the agreement in the first place.
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With only 712 deployed troops, it was impossible for ECOMOG to successfully
protect the border between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. Furthermore, the lack of proper
equipment (i.e. vehicles and radios), created an atmosphere of fear that prevented the
troops to patrol at night, causing other serious logistical problems.193 Therefore, it appears
that the lack of capability is responsible for the failure of hypothesis three, rather than the
lack of will.194
Like in Sierra Leone, the goal of the rebellion was to overthrow the current
government, although Mané claimed he had no political aspirations other than to clear his
name.195 Under hypothesis four, a governmental conflict should have been more likely to
result in peace; however, as seen in the Sierra Leone case and the quantitative results, this
was not the case. Once again, as in Sierra Leone, the inclusion of the self-proclaimed junta
in the government could have caused enough tension to break the already fragile
agreement.
Finally, ECOMOG had now been established for 8 years and thus, according to Haftel
and Thompson, had a .6 more chance of creating a durable peace agreement than newly
created organizations.196 Unfortunately, it was not enough to make them sufficiently
independent to be able to pacify the conflict in Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria was still the
hegemon within ECOWAS and its lack of involvement, due to over engagement in Sierra
Leone, cause greater trouble for the intervention.
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Unlike ECOWAS, the OSCE was an organization created with the intent that it would
have the responsibility of not only peacefully settling disputes among its members, but also
handle conflict management, including early warning and post-conflict duties.197 Primarily,
the OSCE made conflict management a priority and based the structure of the organization
around this principle.198 Under the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) Final Act of 1975, also known as the Helsinki Final Act, the basis for the security
mandate was laid out.199 Born under the shadow of the Cold War, CSCE was the only
regional organization at the time which was all inclusive, 200 exemplified by having both the
United States and the Soviet Union as members.201 In this aspect, the CSCE goes beyond the
literal definition of “regional” but still includes the states in its geographic region,
particularly after its member numbers swelled from 35 to 53, post Soviet Union breakup.202
Although the Helsinki Final Act included other aspects of co-operation such as
human, economic, environmental, and technological dimensions, the primary focus of this
study is in its politico-military dimension in relation to peacemaking and peacekeeping.
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After the 1992 Summit, the Helsinki Document of 1992 strengthened the CSCE’s
peacekeeping arm and created the Forum for Security Co-operation whose tasks include:





regular consultations and intensive co-operation on military security matters;
negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures;
further reduction of the risks of conflict, and
the implementation of agreed measures.203
The CSCE has relied more on voluntary implementation by its members rather than

a binding charter; thus showing that it is dedicated to building confidence in its respect for
territorial and political sovereignty of member states. Once it was institutionalized, the
CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
although it still focuses on voluntary cooperation, it now has a “hard option” of using
peacekeepers, either its own or requesting another organization (such as the UN or NATO)
to implement its decisions while maintaining direct control.204 Furthermore, with the
elimination of the Soviet Union, the OSCE included the pursuit of liberal democratic values
as part of its charter.205
The OSCE has had a progressive outlook on its role as an inclusive regional
organization but has encountered obstacles due to finance troubles as well as due to full
lack of independence from member states, particularly in relation to the conflict in
Moldova.
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The conflict in Moldova had its roots in the Cold War, like many others in the area.
Moldova’s formal borders were established in 1947 under the Soviet Union. At the same
time, socialist policies and the imposition of the Cyrillic script were implemented. After the
fall of the Soviet Union, the Popular Front of Moldavia gained popularity due to its calls for
a return to Latin script, the Romanian language and the Romanian flag. In an attempt to
meet some of these petitions, the government of Moldova amended the Constitution in
1989 and added the Law “On Granting the Moldavian Language the Status of State
Language and the Return to It of Latin Script.” Although the law attempted to be inclusive,
it debunked Russian as the main language and sparked concern over oncoming
discrimination.206
Transdniestria, located primarily between the Dniester River to the West and
Ukraine to the East, declared autonomy on September 2, 1990 and created the Moldovan
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Republika, or PMR).
Moldova followed and formed the Republic of Moldova in June 1990. Both territories
formed parallel systems of government, however, the CSCE did not recognize the PMR
because it violated the inviolability of borders and the CSCE supports the autonomy of
established states. In contrast, Russia supported Transdniestria due to the asset they could
prove to be as an ally, particularly since Transdniestria wanted to keep Soviet rule while
Moldova desired democratic rule.207 Therefore, although the dispute was primarily
territorial, it was also political and ideological.
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Despite some early attempts at negotiation to unify the state, armed conflict broke
out by March of 1992 and ended in July of 1992, resulting in a brutal, albeit short, war with
roughly 700 battle deaths208 and an estimated 5,000 soldier and civilian deaths. The
presence of Russia’s 14th Army in Transdniestria pushed back Moldova and proved to be
controversial, particularly since from Moldova’s and the CSCE positions were that this was
an internal conflict. 209 On July 21, 1992, Russia brokered a ceasefire with the Republic of
Moldova.
The Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the
Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova called for a withdrawal of troops within
seven days and the creation of a security zone. A Joint Control Commission composed of
members of the three conflicting parties was to oversee the agreement and Russia’s 14th
Army was tasked with keeping neutrality while the negotiations over the incompatibility
took place.210 Despite their presence, tensions remained high. By July of 1993, the Republic
of Moldova requested active involvement by the OSCE.211
Initially, the head of mission of the OSCE was the chief mediator with the assistance
of Russia and the Ukraine. A series of problem solving workshops (PSWs), which “bring
together influential yet unofficial representatives of the parties for informal discussions to
open up communication, facilitate a joint analysis of sources and dynamics of the conflict,
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and create direction and options for its resolution which are then fed into official
policymaking and/or negotiations,”212 were held between 1993 and 1996, culminating in
the Memorandum on the Bases for normalization of Relations Between the Republic of
Moldova and Transdneistria, also known as the Primakov Memorandum, signed on May 8,
1997.213
The leaders of Moldova and Transdneistria reaffirmed their previous commitment
to pursue a solution to the conflict and agreed to not use violence or threat of force in order
to do so. In addition, it recognized the Soviet-era borders of Moldova by introducing the
idea of the “common state”214 and urged the parties pursue rebuilding a single state in a
following final agreement. Despite being a partial peace agreement, it did call for an end to
violence.215
There were roughly 62 months between the start of the conflict and the
memorandum and five thousand total casualties. The OSCE was the chief mediating body,
making it the primary third party involved. The outstanding issue of the territorial dispute
was outlined and delegated to the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The agreement did not call for
a peacekeeping mission but did enforce the ceasefire agreement. In fact, one of the
outstanding issues was that Moldova demanded the deportation of the Russian 14th army
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Prenegotiation,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 3 (2007): 312. doi: 10.1177/0022343307076638.
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and their equipment stationed on the border but these issues were addressed in other
meetings and draft agreements.216
The partiality hypothesis is difficult to assess given the presence of Russia in this
case as a unitary state actor – as a party to the conflict on the Transdniestrian side – and a
member of the OSCE as a mediator. If Russia is taken as a state actor then the OSCE can be
seen as an insider-partial actor, as it is willing to compromise with both sides. However, as
Russia is a member of the OSCE and was a part of the mediation process, then a bias was
clearly shown towards Transdniestria.
These mutually exclusive positions have proven to be a hindrance to the resolution
of this frozen conflict; however, all parties involved desire a general resolution to the
conflict.217 Both Moldova and Transdniestria seemed to view the OSCE separately from
Russia, welcoming the OSCE involvement as a forum for negotiation and discussion.218
Therefore, the OSCE did posses relational partiality and lacked outcome partiality in this
case. Despite complications, the peace has held for over five years without a resurgence of
violence between the PMR and the Republic of Moldova. The null of hypothesis one can be
rejected in this case as the agreement was successful.
In regards to the specificity of the agreement made, although the ceasefire article
did not specify what constitutes a breach of agreement, it did clarify that “peaceful means”
include “negotiations and consultations with the assistance and mediation of the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, as guarantor States for the fulfillment of the agreements achieved;
Freire, Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union, 216.
Williams, “Conflict resolution after the Cold War,” 83.
218 Freire, Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union, 212-213.
216
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of the OSCE and the assistant of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].”219 In
regards to the agreement terms, this agreement was part of a process and although the
outstanding issues were delegated to a commission, the terms of this agreement did not
address the incompatibility beyond stating that the parties should work towards a
resolution.
As a security actor, the OSCE has focused on an all encompassing view of security,
including human rights, economic and environmental issues, and other non-traditional
areas aside from the politico-military dimension.220 The OSCE has not given a vested
interest to the traditional enforcement aspect of security. During the years following the
memorandum, the OSCE was unable to force compliance with the agreement, traditionally
or otherwise, particularly from Russia who persistently violates its commitments to
withdraw troops from the area.221 Although no final agreement had been reached, both
continue to take part in peaceful talks and negotiations; therefore, the agreement has not
been broken.
As seen in the quantitative results, territory is the least likely incompatibility to
result in a long duration of peace. As seen in Moldova, a conflict over territory has proven
to be immensely difficult to solve, although some of the hindrance comes from other third
parties. However, the conflict in Moldova has not erupted into another violent debacle and
is seen as a “frozen” conflict. In the strict definition of what constitutes success in this
study, the agreement has been a success.
“Memorandum On the Bases for the Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and
Transdneistria,” 2.
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Summary
The benefits of case studies are that they allow the application of variables to the
‘real world’. Quantitative results are undoubtedly useful; however, clear examples that
illustrate the presence of each variable and explain the events of specific events can be
more useful to apply to policy changes. Overall, two of the three examined conflicts were
considered a success. In comparing the two agreements in Sierra Leone that were
spearheaded by ECOWAS, the importance of institutionalization of organizations and the
commitment to enforcement is apparent. In Guinea-Bissau, there was a lack of specificity in
the agreement and there was a lack of trust between the parties and towards the involved
third parties, including ECOMOG.
In Moldova, the OSCE’s nontraditional approach to peacekeeping, coupled with
Russia’s mutually exclusive positions towards the conflict, made enforcement of the
agreement more difficult. However, the specificity of the agreement and the comprehensive
inclusiveness of the OSCE’s view of security assisted in ceasing hostilities between the
parties, despite the incompatibility encompassing aspects of territorial and ethnic issues.
Though the conflict is, as of yet, unresolved, the scope of this research studies the duration
of peace – meaning a lack of violent conflict; thus Moldova is a success.
In terms of policy making, these cases also illustrate that although regional
organizations can be a powerful tool in conflict situations, particularly when mediation is
necessary, they need to be bolstered. Many regional organizations are still young, relatively

72

speaking, and their capabilities are limited by lack of experience, manpower, and/or
finances. Training in all aspects of conflict management, prevention, and post-conflict
rehabilitation must be given. The internal dynamics of regional organizations are also
unique from one another, some choosing to focus more on conflict prevention (such as the
OSCE), some more on economic issues (such as ECOWAS when it first began and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]). Despite these wide differences, there is
something to be said for creating a general format of power-sharing between member
states and formal agreement creation to establish obligations and requirements.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to examine the contributions of regional
organizations to conflict management. Chapter One introduced the concept of the advent of
regional organizations and how they have become a more prominent actor in the
international scene. Chapter Two began covering a majority of the arguments for and
against regional organizations as well as giving a background to the history of regional
organizations as a whole and their current place within the international framework,
specifically their relationship to the United Nations. According to the United Nations,
regional organizations are a valuable asset; however, it is a vertical relationship, as any
organization must clear any action with the Security Council.222
Due to the various debates for and against the further incorporation of regional
organizations, a definitive answer to their effectiveness and success rate would help clear
the argument. Several of the authors who advocate the use of international organizations
tout their ability to more closely relate to states in their region due to shared interests,
general history, and similar cultures.223 Others claim that a regional organization’s forte is
in its geographical proximity to conflicts that, theoretically, would be conducive to
identifying a potential conflict prior to violence or responding quickly to an outbreak of
violence.224
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There are also those against the use of regional organizations in conflicts, either
claiming that they are merely pawns or fronts for regional hegemons,225 or that they are far
too ill-equipped financially, militarily, and politically to properly handle conflict
management. Generally, the consensus among those against the use of regional
organizations is that the United Nations is far better equipped to handle international crisis
situations. However, the United Nations is not always welcome and, several times, is seen
as an outside intruder, as in the case of Sierra Leone. Furthermore, as Kabia pointed out,
the disengagement of the West, including the UN, on the crises in Africa left ECOWAS with
no other choice.226 Should this disengagement occur once more, it would be beneficial to
have an organization that is well equipped to handle the situation.
Apart from the argument of whether or not regional organizations should be
primary conflict managers, there are studies that have found that the contents of a peace
agreement can determine its success or failure.227 Other variables deemed to have an effect
include whether the incompatibility was over something intractable (such as ethnicity or
religion), the intensity of conflict, and duration of the conflict.
Chapter Three addressed these arguments by hypothesizing that regional
organizations do have a positive effect on the duration of peace when controlling for
partiality, agreement terms, enforcement, incompatibility, and the institutionalization level
of the organization. Of those five hypotheses, two were tested quantitatively with binary
logistic regression. Hypothesis two addressed agreement terms and whether or not they
Dorn “Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way,”3.
Kabia, Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West, 187.
227 Nathan, “The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations,” 3.
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had a significant effect on the outcome. With a significance of 0.027, regional organizations
were found to be roughly 3.5 times more likely to craft an agreement that ceases hostilities
for at least five years. Furthermore, although regional organizations did not reach
statistical significance upon testing hypothesis four, it was discovered that contrary to the
hypothesis that intractable conflicts were far less likely to end in peace, territory is the
most difficult incompatibility to end peacefully, when controlling for third party
involvement. Additional regressions also showed that when controlling for all other
variables, regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that
ceases hostilities between dyads for a period of at least five years.
The case studies in Chapter Four served as examples to apply the hypotheses to.
Recalling conflicts where the involvement of regional organizations succeeded and failed
can solidly illustrate what aspects of the regional organizations helped or hindered the
peace agreement process and how it affected the outcome. Furthermore, external
influences on the peace process were also discussed, such as the presence of Russia and its
role in Moldova, and the affects they had on the efficacy of regional organizations.
Of the agreements that succeeded, the organizations had previous experience in
mediating and had the capability and willingness to enforce the agreement. In some cases
the physical capabilities such as military equipment and personally may have come from
other organizations (i.e. UN and Russia); however, with proper financing and training,
regional organizations have the potential to achieve the same results.
Other avenues that this research could have taken would have been the inclusion of
other regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the
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African Union (AU), or the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). Including
other regional organizations in the case studies could further the application of the
hypothesis to different regions. Also, the inclusion of the capacity of states receiving
interventions by outside parties could also be included. Quantitatively, other variables
could have been included, such as the yearly finances of regional organizations, the GDP of
member states, number of available peacekeepers versus number of dispatched
peacekeepers (if there were provided for in the agreement) and how much of the finances
were directed towards the conflict they were mediating. These variables could have
bolstered hypothesis three in terms of being capable of enforcing an agreement.
Further studies may want to include the above variables in order to further test the
hypotheses. In addition, case studies could also address peace agreements made at
different point of a regional organizations life span or address how many conflicts a
regional organization had intervened in prior to its involvement in the conflict being
addressed. Those case studies potentially could bolster hypothesis five.
This study sought to investigate whether or not regional organizations were
effective at crafting peace agreements that stood the test of time in stopping violent conflict
between dyads. Quantitatively, hypothesis two illustrated that regional organizations are a
viable route to achieve this goal. Although regional organizations were not significant in
hypothesis four, the odds ratio was still higher than other options in achieving peace.
Qualitatively, the null of hypothesis one could not be rejected due to the outcome partiality
of Nigeria within ECOMOG; however, in the case of Moldova the null could be rejected due
to the success of the agreement and the lack of outcome partiality.
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Hypothesis three showed that ECOMOG was initially unwilling to enforce
agreements in Sierra Leone, particular Conkary and Lomé; however, took an active role in
the Abuja Peace agreement which held. Further studies could include variables to test the
role of rebel strength as a fact; however, as this was outside the scope of this study, the
willingness to enforce made a difference in Sierra Leone. In Moldova, the ceasefire was
continually enforced by Russia’s peacekeepers and OSCE oversight. Hypothesis five
preliminarily showed the importance of the life span of an organization to the success of
peace agreements. However, in terms of institutionalization, future studies may want to
account for other measures, such as previous experience in conflict management.
As mentioned previously, regional organizations are an asset to the UN already;
however, regional organizations require more backing in order to be truly effective. A large
portion of that requires cooperation among member states in order to be logistically able
to respond to rising conflicts. However, financing and training for mediators and
peacekeepers are also necessary in order to make enforcement possible without external
assistance. Much policy is needed to bolster the role of regional organizations and more
research is necessary in seeing what are the most effective methods and policies for
regional organizations to have among member states and in their approach to conflicts in
their “jurisdictions.”
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Table 5: Logistic Regression - 3rd Party Type and Region
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log likelihood
Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1
266.360a
.114
.153
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has
been reached. Final solution cannot be found.

Step
1

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Chi-square
df
3.124
6

Sig.
.793

Classification Tablea
Observed

Step 1

Conflict
Absence of conflict

Conflict in 5 years?

Predicted
Conflict in 5 years?
Conflict
Absence of
conflict
111
14
61
29

Percentage
Correct
88.8
32.2

Overall Percentage

65.1

a. The cut value is .500

N=215

B

Variables in the Equation
S.E.
Wald
df

party3_type

Step 1a

State
Regional Org.
United Nations
Other 4rd
party

Constant
a.
b.

5.278

4

.260

Exp(B)

95% C.I.for
EXP(B)
Lower
Upper

.440
1.068
-.088

.403
.549
.518

1.190
3.785
.029

1
1
1

.275
.052
.865

1.553
2.910
.916

.704
.992
.332

3.422
8.533
2.527

.643

.444

2.094

1

.148

1.902

.796

4.543

10.514

4

.033
.000
.820
.200
.214

.
13.255
1.929
1.561

Region
Europe
Middle East
Asia
Africa

Sig.

-21.524
1.193
-.477
-.548

13249.891
.710
.579
.507

.000
2.823
.680
1.169

1
1
1
1

.999
.093
.409
.280

.000
3.296
.620
.578

-.278

.497

.313

1

.576

.757

Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Region.
p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
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Table 6: Logistic Regression: 3rd Party Type and Outstanding Issues
Model Summary
Step
-2 Log likelihood
Cox & Snell R Square
Nagelkerke R Square
1
251.133a
.174
.235
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Step
1

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
df

Chi-square
5.903

Sig.
7

.551

Classification Tablea
Observed

Predicted
Conflict in 5 years?
Percentage Correct
Conflict Absence of conflict
Conflict
106
19
84.8
Conflict in 5 years?
Step 1
Absence of conflict
42
48
53.3
Overall Percentage
71.6
a. The cut value is .500

N=215

B

Variables in the Equation
S.E.
Wald
df

party3_type
11.356
State
.646
.421
2.361
Regional Org.
1.244
.564
4.860
United Nations
-.746
.494
2.274
Other 3rd Party
.845
.506
2.786
Out_iss
31.776
Step 1a Process to finalize
2.259
.456
24.553
Spelled out
.691
.515
1.799
Delegated to
-.071
.618
.013
commission
New negotiations
.874
.510
2.939
Outline for future
2.528
.758
11.131
Constant
-1.709
.412
17.166
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, Outlin.
b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
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Sig.

4
1
1
1
1
5
1
1

.023*
.124
.027*
.132
.095
.000***
.000***
.180

1
1
1
1

Exp(B)

95% C.I.for
EXP(B)
Lower
Upper

1.909
3.470
.474
2.328

.837
1.148
.180
.863

4.354
10.492
1.250
6.277

9.571
1.995

3.917
.727

23.388
5.475

.908

.931

.278

3.125

.086
.001**
.000***

2.396
12.531
.181

.882
2.838

6.506
55.340

Table 7 - Logistic Regression for 3rd Party Type, Outline, and Region
Model Summary
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R
Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
a
1
264.685
.121
.162
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because
maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot
be found.
Step

Classification Tablea,b
Observed

Predicted
Conflict in 5 years?
Percentage Correct
Conflict Absence of conflict
Conflict
125
0
100.0
Conflict in 5 years?
Absence of conflict
90
0
.0
Step 0
Overall Percentage
58.1
a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step
1

Chi-square

df

Sig.

13.695

7

.057

N=215

B

Variables in the Equation
S.E.
Wald
df

party3_type
State
Regional Org.
United Nations
Other 3rd Party
Step 1a

.405
.552
.520
.447

Region
Europe
Middle East
Asia
Africa
Outlin
Constant

a.
b.

.438
1.076
-.030
.672

Sig.

5.238

4

.264

1.169
3.800
.003
2.256

1
1
1
1

.280
.051*
.955
.133

9.000

4

.061

Exp(B)

1.549
2.933
.971
1.958

.701
.994
.350
.815

3.426
8.651
2.691
4.708

.000
.828
.199
.238
.799

.
13.611
1.939
1.806
2.992

-21.491
1.211
-.476
-.422
.436

13156.003
.714
.580
.517
.337

.000
2.875
.671
.666
1.677

1
1
1
1
1

.999
.090
.413
.414
.195

.000
3.357
.622
.656
1.546

-.498

.527

.893

1

.345

.608

Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Region, Outlin.
p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
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95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower
Upper

Table 8 - Logistic Regression of 3rd Party type, Outstanding Issues, and Battle Deaths
Model Summary
-2 Log likelihood
Cox & Snell R
Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
1
213.331a
.209
.280
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because
parameter estimates changed by less than .001.
Step

Classification Tablea,b
Observed

Step 0

Conflict
Absence of conflict

Conflict in 5 years?

Predicted
Conflict in 5 years?
Conflict
Absence of
conflict
109
0
80
0

Percentage
Correct
100.0
.0
57.7

Overall Percentage
a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1
5.934 8 .655

N=189

B

S.E.

Variables in the Equation
Wald
df

party3_type
11.866
State
.270
.466
.336
Regional Org.
1.549
.635
5.946
United Nations
-.898
.514
3.053
Other 3rd Party
.612
.553
1.222
Out_iss
31.335
Process to
2.554
.500
26.071
finalize
Step 1a
Spelled out
1.174
.605
3.768
To commission
.183
.702
.068
New
1.101
.585
3.542
negotiations
Agenda for
2.763
.794
12.121
future
batdeathdum
.048
.363
.018
Constant
-1.860
.518
12.905
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: party3_type, Out_iss, batdeathdum.
b. p = * ≤.05; **≤ .01; ***≤ .000
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Sig.

Exp(B)

95% C.I.for EXP(B)
Lower
Upper

4
1
1
1
1
5

.018*
.562
.015*
.081
.269
.000***

1.310
4.706
.407
1.843

.526
1.355
.149
.623

3.262
16.344
1.116
5.452

1

.000***

12.859

4.824

34.276

1
1

.052*
.795

3.234
1.200

.989
.303

10.581
4.752

1

.060

3.007

.955

9.467

1

.000***

15.846

3.345

75.064

1
1

.895
.000***

1.049
.156

.515

2.136
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